생명윤리에서의 넓은 반성적 평형과 판단력

Abstract

Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs.