미국연방위임장규칙의 개정 동향과 시사점
The Revised Trends of the SEC Rule in USA
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초록
미국에서 proxy access는 2012년 주주총회 시즌 당초에 상정된 proxy access의 모습과는 다른 형태이지만, 상당히 빠르게 보급되고 있다. 이처럼 급속하게 확대된 이유로서는 SEC 규칙의 개정을 우선적으로 들 수 있겠지만, proxy access를 주주의 기본적 권리의 하나로 위치시키는 기관투자가․기관투자가단체․의결권행사조언회사 등의 영향력도 커다란 원인이라 할 수 있다. proxy access 규정을 정관에 규정하는 회사가 많아졌다고는 해도, 이 규정에 근거하여 주주가 지명한 이사후보자가 주주총회소집통지 등에 기재된 사례는 확인할 수 없으며, proxy access가 실제 어떠한 모습으로 이용되는지는 상당히 흥미 깊다. 이 글에서는 이미 논의의 대상이 되었던 맹아를 확인한 다음, 커다란 파도에 이른 원동력으로서의 추진력 등에 관하여 살펴보고, 미국에서의 proxy access에 대하여 고찰하기로 한다.
Abstract
Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders to include proposals in the company’s proxy statement. This Rule contains a number of substantive grounds for exclusion, including proposals relating to the election of directors. The election exclusion has evolved to allow for the omission of proposals that specifically affect an upcoming election. Until 2010, the exclusion applied to proposals that would have allowed shareholders to include nominees in company proxy materials. This article argues the SEC has impeded shareholder franchise through the election exclusion under Rule 14a-8. Especially, Part Ⅱ and Ⅲ traces the admin-istrative history of the exclusion and analyzes the SEC staff’s (the staff) interpretation. Part Ⅳ discusses more recent developments regarding the exclusion including changes to shareholder access to the nomination process. Part Ⅴ considers the problems presented by the exclusion and pro-poses a narrower staff interpretation. Election to the board of directors represents perhaps the most important function for shareholders. Directors –not shareholders- manage the company. Accordingly, as a means of holding elected representatives accountable and providing incentives for directors to focus on shareholder interests, “the powers of corporate democracy are at (the shareholders’) disposal to turn the board out.” SEC Rule 14a-8, however, restricts shareholders’ ability to influence board composition. From the outset, the Commission prohibited the use of the Rule to nominate directors. The Rule likewise prohibited shareholders from including proposals in the proxy statement that would have provided access to the proxy materials for their nominees. While the 2010 revisions provided shareholders with greater flexibility, staff interpretation continues to restrict shareholder efforts to influence the composition of the board.
참고문헌 (14)
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