Entry Policy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution
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The Fourth Industrial Revolution promises the radical reshaping of markets, of lifestyles, and, perhaps, even of governments and fundamental social order. Indeed, the Fourth Industrial Revolution assumes that innovation will come from widely disparate technologies into widely disparate markets, in fundamentally unpredictable ways. This paper argues that the premises of the Fourth Industrial revolution demand modesty about government policy, but nevertheless suggest certain general imperatives that should focus competition and regulatory policy. Because the Fourth Industrial Revolution promises innovation in new and surprising ways, the fundamental government imperative should be to ensure entry into markets. Indeed, entry should be the watchword across all domains. Focusing on two bodies of law and two areas of policy — competition law, regulated industries law, education, and research funding — governments can take concrete steps to improve the environment for the unpredictable and systemic innovation that the Fourth Industrial Revolution promises. This paper starts by establishing the importance of entry policy to the Fourth Industrial Revolution and then moves to each of the identified areas, concluding by noting that “entry” as a guiding principle can shape policy in other areas (and justifying this paper’s ignoring intellectual property policy, at least until the coda). In competition law, entry policy requires continuing to attack cartels, a U.S.-style approach to vertical restraints, and merger review that is sensitive to innovation effects. In regulation, governments should separate health and safety from economic regulation, ensure interconnection to persistent monopoly, attack externalities directly, and set competitively neutral universal service policy. Lest there be any mistake, entry defined narrowly or acting on its own cannot address all of the issues created by the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The expected innovations may create significant employment losses, population displacement, in-equality, and even safety and security issues. But if entry policy is seen through a broad lens, one that is sensitive to human entry into markets and the public good aspects of education, entry as a guiding principle can support policies that themselves remedy some of the more jarring effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Abstract
The Fourth Industrial Revolution promises the radical reshaping of markets, of lifestyles, and, perhaps, even of governments and fundamental social order. Indeed, the Fourth Industrial Revolution assumes that innovation will come from widely disparate technologies into widely disparate markets, in fundamentally unpredictable ways. This paper argues that the premises of the Fourth Industrial revolution demand modesty about government policy, but nevertheless suggest certain general imperatives that should focus competition and regulatory policy. Because the Fourth Industrial Revolution promises innovation in new and surprising ways, the fundamental government imperative should be to ensure entry into markets. Indeed, entry should be the watchword across all domains. Focusing on two bodies of law and two areas of policy — competition law, regulated industries law, education, and research funding — governments can take concrete steps to improve the environment for the unpredictable and systemic innovation that the Fourth Industrial Revolution promises. This paper starts by establishing the importance of entry policy to the Fourth Industrial Revolution and then moves to each of the identified areas, concluding by noting that “entry” as a guiding principle can shape policy in other areas (and justifying this paper’s ignoring intellectual property policy, at least until the coda). In competition law, entry policy requires continuing to attack cartels, a U.S.-style approach to vertical restraints, and merger review that is sensitive to innovation effects. In regulation, governments should separate health and safety from economic regulation, ensure interconnection to persistent monopoly, attack externalities directly, and set competitively neutral universal service policy. Lest there be any mistake, entry defined narrowly or acting on its own cannot address all of the issues created by the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The expected innovations may create significant employment losses, population displacement, in-equality, and even safety and security issues. But if entry policy is seen through a broad lens, one that is sensitive to human entry into markets and the public good aspects of education, entry as a guiding principle can support policies that themselves remedy some of the more jarring effects of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
참고문헌 (41)
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