Study on the Formation Mechanism of Autonomy of Chinese Listed Companies
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With the continuous development of China’s securities market, listed companies have gradually established a standardized governance system. At present, the governance of listed companies has gained the attention of academia. The development of China’s capital market is faced with unique real-world problems. Due to the differences in history and the nature of property rights, different forms of corporate assets have emerged from those of foreign companies. The existence of this form has caused the coexistence of two types of agent problems in Chinese listed companies. The parties in conflict of interest cover the actual controller, shareholders and listed companies. As an independent legal person, listed companies should protect the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders. The current governance system of listed companies is difficult to restrain the opportunistic behavior of the actual controller. Therefore, if the effective controller or major shareholder holds the actual power of the listed company through the equity setting and voting arrangement, they have the motive to directly influence the internal power allocation of the listed company in order to gain excess control gains. This study clarifies the positive governance role of autonomy for sustainable corporate development from the interaction of three subjects: the actual controller, the majority shareholder or parent company and the listed company. Provides inspiration and reference to the autonomy of listed companies and the protection of stakeholders’ rights and interests.
Abstract
With the continuous development of China’s securities market, listed companies have gradually established a standardized governance system. At present, the governance of listed companies has gained the attention of academia. The development of China’s capital market is faced with unique real-world problems. Due to the differences in history and the nature of property rights, different forms of corporate assets have emerged from those of foreign companies. The existence of this form has caused the coexistence of two types of agent problems in Chinese listed companies. The parties in conflict of interest cover the actual controller, shareholders and listed companies. As an independent legal person, listed companies should protect the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders. The current governance system of listed companies is difficult to restrain the opportunistic behavior of the actual controller. Therefore, if the effective controller or major shareholder holds the actual power of the listed company through the equity setting and voting arrangement, they have the motive to directly influence the internal power allocation of the listed company in order to gain excess control gains. This study clarifies the positive governance role of autonomy for sustainable corporate development from the interaction of three subjects: the actual controller, the majority shareholder or parent company and the listed company. Provides inspiration and reference to the autonomy of listed companies and the protection of stakeholders’ rights and interests.
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