18~19세기 淸代 錢糧의 錢納과 지방재정

Abstract

The Qing Dynasty has been opening the path of tax payment in coins(‘錢納’) since Shunzhi period. Initially, 錢納 was allowed in the name of activating the circulation of coins. In 1733, For the convenience of the people, Yongzheng Emperor continued to allow 錢納, and a relatively specific standard was established by limiting the total amount of tax to be paid to less than 1/10 taels. However, during the Qianlong period, each provinces showed differences in the practice of 錢納 differently from the principles according to local circumstances. This trend is gradually accelerating, and it seems that during the year of Jiaqing and Daoguang, a wider range of 錢納 was implemented. The reason that 錢納 was expanded was because 錢納 became an additional income for local finance. Since each province of the Qing Dynasty had to provide voluntary expenses for local expenditures even through the tānjuān(‘攤捐’), they collected more by carrying out 錢納 regardless of whether silver was expensive or cheap. The problem lies in the way the emperor and the Board of Revenue deal with local governments who use the local facts and ignore the principles suggested by the dynasty. During all periods of Qianlong, Jiaqing, and Daoguang, inspectors have accused the facts of taxation that are inconsistent with the rules of the dynasty. Each time, the emperor referred to the principles of the dynasty and ordered the provincial officials to be strictly control or to investigate the actual situation. Provincial officials acted according to the emperor's orders, but at every opportunity, they professed the inevitability of local circumstances, and gradually devised a method that was different from the principles of the dynasty. In this process, the emperor understands the local situation through provincial officials, and appears to condone the other administrative methods and principles of the province(‘省例’). I think it is about finding a balance between punishment and acquiescence by getting a report of the truth through inspectors, understanding the situation through provincial officials. It can be seen that the local situation, which differs from the principles of the dynasty, was not necessarily a point to be recognized as a slackness of discipline of local government. The unavoidable circumstances recognized by the emperor, provincial officials, and local officials in relation to the management of local finances could lead to the emperor's acquiescence. However, the emperor always had the power to draw swords and cruelly punish local officials who violate the rules of the dynasty, and throughout the Qing Dynasty, it can be seen that in certain cases. On the border between punishment and acquiescence, the standard consensus(‘公議’) of the rulers seems to be lurking. At least, the ‘公議’ seen through the issues of local financial management and 錢納 dealt with in this paper had a great relationship with whether it actually harmed or provided convenience to small-famers(‘小戶’). In a situation where it was inevitable to obtain the need for management from the people, even a practical fúshōu(‘浮收’) or additional collection could be tolerated even if it deviated from the rules of the dynasty to some extent if it was ultimately comfortable for the people. If there was no basis to admit it as an inevitable situation, It was never tolerated to be ultimately judged to be harmful to the people. The line between punishment and acquiescence, where ‘公議’ are located, has the potential to change location gradually depending on the time or issue. in that flexibility, It seems that the foundation for the expansion of local finances has already been established from an early period.