러시아 은행제도의 개혁

Abstract

In the aftermath of Russia’s August 1998 financial crisis, many observers hoped that genuine reform and restructuring would occur in the Russian banking sector. Unfortunately, almost a year and a half after the crisis, the sector hobbles along with only a few half-steps taken towards effective restructuring. Although some banks have been closed, consolidation into a few strong and competitive banking institutions has not occurred. While many analysts anticipated the emergence of only 450-500 strong and competitive banks, the reality is that over 1,300 banks still existed in late 1999. In addition, authorities have revoked and reinstated the licenses of bankrupt banks in seemingly arbitrary ways. Major bankers have also been guilty of asset stripping in the aftermath of August 1998, and have successfully transferred assets from bankrupt entities to new banks. None of them have been called into account for their fraudulent practices. 1999 proved to be a much better year for Russian banks than many had originally anticipated. Liquidity in the sector increased due to rising commodity prices (especially oil) and growing government coffers. In addition, banks have yet to settle numerous forward contracts with domestic and foreign counterparty, and liquidity and profitability could tighten as such liabilities come due. A renewed emphasis by multilateral institutions--including The World Bank, IMF, EU, and EBRD--to assist Russian reforms in accounting practices, bank supervision, bankruptcies, and overall restructuring is quite welcome. But these efforts will be nullified unless the Russian government itself decides to take banking sector reform more seriously. However, these bright spots are likely to prove meaningless unless Russian authorities take more focused and effective steps toward reform in the banking sector.