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OECD 철강보조금협정 초안의 허용보조금에 관한 분석

An Analysis of OECD Draft Text of an Agreement to Reduce or Eliminate Trade-Distorting Subsidies in Steel

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Due to the usage of steel in various industries including automobile, construction and national defense, many countries have maintained steel industry in excess of the capacities of their economies. In the meantime, increase in prices of raw materials and transportation has resulted in the reduction of margins in the steel industry in spite of the substantial increase of steel prices. In such situation, a number of countries have provided their steel industries with subsidies of various forms. In turn, WTO member states have taken provisional measures espoused by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures('ASCM') to protect their steel industries, but this has not proved be a fundamental solution for the problem of excessive production and trade distortion in the industry. Under the initiative of the United States whose steel industry had been at stake in the aftermath of the global financial crisis triggered by Asian market in 1997 and the dramatic increase of steel imports, countries began discussion on the problem of steel subsidies in order to resolve worldwide structural excess capacity in the industry and the underlying trade distorting practices. The discussion of an Agreement to Reduce or Eliminate Trade- Distorting Subsidies in Steel ('Steel Subsidies Agreement' or 'SSA') is largely based on the ASCM. The draft Steel Subsidies Agreement follows the ASCM's definition of subsidy and specificity, and the two Agreements are alike in terms of the elements of the exceptions to the prohibited subsidies, such as research and development subsidies, environmental subsidies, and disadvantaged regions subsidies. The draft SSA, however, can be characterized as 'WTO Plus', that is, more strengthened than the ASCM in that some subsidies which fall under actionable subsidies under the ASCM are prohibited under the SSA. On the other hand, it also has features of 'WTO Minus'. It provides for broad exceptions to prohibited subsidies, especially subsidies for privatisation, natural disaster, training, recruitment of disadvantaged or disabled workers, and small and medium sized enterprises which are not regarded as exceptions under the ASCM.

Abstract

Due to the usage of steel in various industries including automobile, construction and national defense, many countries have maintained steel industry in excess of the capacities of their economies. In the meantime, increase in prices of raw materials and transportation has resulted in the reduction of margins in the steel industry in spite of the substantial increase of steel prices. In such situation, a number of countries have provided their steel industries with subsidies of various forms. In turn, WTO member states have taken provisional measures espoused by the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures('ASCM') to protect their steel industries, but this has not proved be a fundamental solution for the problem of excessive production and trade distortion in the industry. Under the initiative of the United States whose steel industry had been at stake in the aftermath of the global financial crisis triggered by Asian market in 1997 and the dramatic increase of steel imports, countries began discussion on the problem of steel subsidies in order to resolve worldwide structural excess capacity in the industry and the underlying trade distorting practices. The discussion of an Agreement to Reduce or Eliminate Trade- Distorting Subsidies in Steel ('Steel Subsidies Agreement' or 'SSA') is largely based on the ASCM. The draft Steel Subsidies Agreement follows the ASCM's definition of subsidy and specificity, and the two Agreements are alike in terms of the elements of the exceptions to the prohibited subsidies, such as research and development subsidies, environmental subsidies, and disadvantaged regions subsidies. The draft SSA, however, can be characterized as 'WTO Plus', that is, more strengthened than the ASCM in that some subsidies which fall under actionable subsidies under the ASCM are prohibited under the SSA. On the other hand, it also has features of 'WTO Minus'. It provides for broad exceptions to prohibited subsidies, especially subsidies for privatisation, natural disaster, training, recruitment of disadvantaged or disabled workers, and small and medium sized enterprises which are not regarded as exceptions under the ASCM.

참고문헌 (10)

  1. 법무부, "WTO 보조금협정 연구", ~ (2003)
  2. 이병우, "OECD 철강보조금협상의 법적 이슈", 한국국제경제법학회 발표문 (2004)
  3. Charnovitz, Steve, "Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies, Working Draft" (2003), Pew Center on Global Climate Change
  4. Ince, William K., "Manual for the Practice of U.S. International Trade Law" (2001), Kluwer Law International
  5. Stewart, Terence P., "Opportunities in the WTO for Increased Liberalization of Goods: Making Sure the Rules Work for All and That Special Needs Are Addressed", Fordham Int'l L. J, 24, pp.652~ (2000)
  6. OECD, "OECD Special Meeting at High-Level on Steel Issues: Steel Agreement Issues, SG", STEEL(2004)3 (29 June 2004), 2004
  7. OECD, "Recent Steel Market Developments (28 June 1994)", ~ (1994)
  8. OECD, "OECD Special Meeting at High-Level on Steel Issues: Ideas for Advancing the Steel Subsidy Talks, SG", STEEL(2004)4 (15 June 2004), 2004
  9. OECD, "Elements of an Agreement to Reduce or Elimination Trade- Distorting Subsidies in Steel; Draft text - Complete Agreement, SG", STEEL(2004)4 (12 May 2004), 2004
  10. OECD, "Elements of an Agreement to Reduce or Elimination Trade- Distorting Subsidies in Steel; Secretariat text on Article 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, Working paper 34 (18 September 2003)", ~ (2003)

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