양면시장에서의 시장획정 및 시장지배력 평가
Market Definition and Dominance Analysis in Two-Sided Markets
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Two-sided markets have existed since ancient times, a certain number of these having significant economic importance. With the plummeting of communication costs, the increase in computer capacity and the advent of a new Internet-based infrastructure, business models wherein different customer groups tied together into a single two-sided market have become less costly to establish. Technological progress has also made possible new highly flexible virtual platforms, as an alternative to easily saturated physical platforms. Such two-sided markets are of particular importance under competition law, as two-sided markets form a complex ecological structure through close and highly correlative connections. As platforms serve as the central link between such co-dependent connections, businesses which control these platforms can control the entirety of the related industry. Taking our current stage of accelerating digital convergence into consideration, the market conduct of the two-sided platform which has established its customer base in a related or adjacent market is enough to attract the attention of competition authority. The two problems concerning the application of competition law on two-sided markets are first the conceptual problem wherein these markets are operated according to different economic principles compared to one-sided markets, and second the practical problem wherein an analysis which takes this into account is highly complicated. It is, however, inappropriate to inflate these obstacles, and the fact remains that the rules of competition law are still valid be it in one-sided or two-sided markets. What must be kept in mind is the need to precisely understand the co-dependence of the two sides in a two-sided market. Studies on two-sided markets only attempt to deal with the other side of what has been discussed concerning network effects, and as such, previous discussions on network effects, such as lock-in effects or barriers to entry, are not rendered meaningless. Studies on two-sided markets simply imply the possibility of such an effect to be controlled to some extent, or to be accepted for the sake of increased efficiency. Under such considerations, attempts to limit the application of competition law under a generalized principle based on studies concerning two-sided markets should be regarded with caution.
Abstract
Two-sided markets have existed since ancient times, a certain number of these having significant economic importance. With the plummeting of communication costs, the increase in computer capacity and the advent of a new Internet-based infrastructure, business models wherein different customer groups tied together into a single two-sided market have become less costly to establish. Technological progress has also made possible new highly flexible virtual platforms, as an alternative to easily saturated physical platforms. Such two-sided markets are of particular importance under competition law, as two-sided markets form a complex ecological structure through close and highly correlative connections. As platforms serve as the central link between such co-dependent connections, businesses which control these platforms can control the entirety of the related industry. Taking our current stage of accelerating digital convergence into consideration, the market conduct of the two-sided platform which has established its customer base in a related or adjacent market is enough to attract the attention of competition authority. The two problems concerning the application of competition law on two-sided markets are first the conceptual problem wherein these markets are operated according to different economic principles compared to one-sided markets, and second the practical problem wherein an analysis which takes this into account is highly complicated. It is, however, inappropriate to inflate these obstacles, and the fact remains that the rules of competition law are still valid be it in one-sided or two-sided markets. What must be kept in mind is the need to precisely understand the co-dependence of the two sides in a two-sided market. Studies on two-sided markets only attempt to deal with the other side of what has been discussed concerning network effects, and as such, previous discussions on network effects, such as lock-in effects or barriers to entry, are not rendered meaningless. Studies on two-sided markets simply imply the possibility of such an effect to be controlled to some extent, or to be accepted for the sake of increased efficiency. Under such considerations, attempts to limit the application of competition law under a generalized principle based on studies concerning two-sided markets should be regarded with caution.
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