플랫폼의 시장획정과 시장지배력에 관한 쟁점

Abstract

As the scale of platform business grows, there is a movement to regulate the scale itself or to strengthen ex ante regulation. Whenever monopoly companies such as Microsoft and Wal-Mart appeared, there was discussion about strengthening similar regulations, but it was possible to respond appropriately to the problem by improving and developing the competition law framework. Many issues arise in competition law area, as the advancement of online platform operators has been remarkable. Regarding market definition, one distinction may be drawn between a transaction (or matching) platform and a non-transaction (or audience providing/advertising) platform. However, there seems to be no inevitable reason to set different standards for market definition only for platforms. In the case of defining the market for the platform according to the traditional approach, there is a tendency to underestimate network effects. Therefore, prior to regulation of platform business, it is necessary to conduct a sufficient investigation and understanding of the market and the business model of the platform as an intermediary. In addition, for online platform business that grow based on a multi-sided market, the existing market definition methods such as SSNIP test have shown their limits. In addition to market share, various qualitative factors, such as new entry or competitive pressure, should be fully considered in the evaluation of market power. Currently, concerns about both over-enforcement and under-enforcement on platforms are raised in the field of competition law. Considering that the platform, new forms of innovation, can provide a lot of utility to consumers and society as a whole, the competition authorities prioritize the law enforcement by focusing on the market where monopoly is fixed rather than the rapidly changing market.