POLITICAL OPTIMAL TAX POLICY MAKING IN A PROBABILISTIC VOTING FRAMEWORK
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Abstract
Tax policy in democratic societies can best be understood as the equilibrium outcome of a political process that trades off economic and political forces within a given set of institutions. We use a probabilistic voting framework to analyze the structure of tax policy in political equilibrium. Among available models, the probabilistic voting or expected vote maximization model appears well suited to deal with tax structure in a democratic setting. In particular, we apply the probabilistic voting model to tax policy making, focusing on analyzing the outcome of vote maximization. We aim to characterize the political equilibrium tax structure, and interpret that equilibrium in a probabilistic voting framework. In addition, we incorporate tax illusion in the probabilistic voting model in which voters perceive candidate's tax policy to be inaccurate, and examine the effect of voter's tax illusion on the political costs.
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