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The Effect of Voters' Benefit Misperceptions on the Tax Policy Making in a Probabilistic Voting Framework

이성규|나성린
경제연구소 (Hanyang Economic Research Institute)|2005.05|Journal of Economic Research (JER)|제10권 제1호|pp. 1-28

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참고문헌

주제분류경제학

초록

Abstract

In a representative democracy, candidates are thought to be judged by voters on the basis of both proposed policies and nonpolicy or random policy characteristics in voters voting decision. We include a random policy variable (misperceived benefit levels) which is separate from or independent of a policy variable (tax policy). We suppose that taxes and benefits are separate in relation, and voters have asymmetric perception about tax and benefit policies proposed by candidates. That is, tax policy is visible and direct to the voters, while benefit policy is less visible and hidden to the voters. Thus, voters may have misperception, or inaccurate perception, of the benefits from public services because of its invisibility. Then, by using probabilistic linkage between tax and benefit policies, we examine the implications of misperceived benefit policies for the electoral equilibrium tax policy in a probabilistic voting framework.

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