공정 개념의 철학적 재구성: 정의, 평등, 공평과 구분 가능한 공정의 의미 탐색

Abstract

As fairness has become the central socio-ethical principle, new controversies are arising every day. It is basically because everyone involved differently understands the social contexts to which fairness is applied. However, it is undeniable that the ambiguity of the meaning of fairness is at its root. Most people do not distinguish fairness from justice, equality, and impartiality. Furthermore, they sometimes exploit the ambiguity to project their ethical opinions on it. The current issue on meritocratic fairness can be said to be a typical example of such a projection. This confusion related to fairness cannot be academically overcome in one scoop, because it is factual rather than theoretical. In that regard, the purpose of this article is primarily to propose a meaning of fairness which makes it possible to treat fairness academically. It is carried out in a way that a distinct meaning of fairness may be speculatively extracted from justice, equality, and impartiality. Thus, fairness is provisionally defined as goal-rational impartiality with equality of opportunity. In addition, this new definition is illustrated with the meritocratic fairness issue. Even if this illustration works well, it does, of course, not show that this definition of fairness is the only proper one. However, we can begin academic discussions on the distinct meaning of fairness with it.