광역과 기초간 세원배분에 관한 연구
A Study on Tax Assignment Upper and Lower Level Local Government
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This paper investigates tax assignment between upper and lower level local governments. The current local tax revenue is far less than local governments need to provide local public services to residents. Since lower level local governments have more information of their residents than any other level of governments, it is efficient for them to have enough tax revenue instead of transfer funds to provide local public services. If local public services are clearly assigned to local governments and residents know for which public services they need to pay local taxes, a great deal of achievement can be attained in enhancing local governments' fiscal power and accountability. Thus, we try to allocate more tax bases to lower level local governments in this paper. In order to simulate tax assignment between two tiers local governments, we assume total local tax revenue does not change after reassignment of tax bases. Because of the unchanged total local tax revenue assumption, upper level local governments may have short of their tax revenue. If it happens we recommends them to cut down their transfer funds to lower level local governments in order to minimize their tax revenue shortfall. The underline purpose of this study is increasing own source of tax revenue by decreasing transfer funds from upper level governments.
Abstract
This paper investigates tax assignment between upper and lower level local governments. The current local tax revenue is far less than local governments need to provide local public services to residents. Since lower level local governments have more information of their residents than any other level of governments, it is efficient for them to have enough tax revenue instead of transfer funds to provide local public services. If local public services are clearly assigned to local governments and residents know for which public services they need to pay local taxes, a great deal of achievement can be attained in enhancing local governments' fiscal power and accountability. Thus, we try to allocate more tax bases to lower level local governments in this paper. In order to simulate tax assignment between two tiers local governments, we assume total local tax revenue does not change after reassignment of tax bases. Because of the unchanged total local tax revenue assumption, upper level local governments may have short of their tax revenue. If it happens we recommends them to cut down their transfer funds to lower level local governments in order to minimize their tax revenue shortfall. The underline purpose of this study is increasing own source of tax revenue by decreasing transfer funds from upper level governments.
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