한국전쟁기 제8군 정보참모부(G-2) 정보보고서 자료 해제

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze US 8th Army G-2 Reports during the Korean War. The primary mission of Far East Command and Eighth Army G-2 and subordinate units - the 442d CIC Battalion, ATIS(Army Translation and Interpreting Service), and the 519th MI Company-was keeping an eye on political parties that might cause trouble for the U. S. military. Neither KMAG nor the CIC actively ran operations into North Korea, so intelligence out of North Korea depended on information gained by CIC interrogation of refugees or captured line-crossers and occasional bits of intelligence furnished by South Korea's Higher Intelligence Department(HID), ROK Army G-2, ROK Navy Office of Naval Investigation, or the South Korean National Police. This proved to be totally inadequate. Eight Army CIC and other intelligence detachments moved north with advancing UN troops. While UN forces withdrew south, Eighth Army G-2 reorganized its tactical positive(behind-the-lines) intelligence operations. A new section under Eighth Army G-2 with the cover designation Korean Liaison Office(KLO) was established to run short-range tactical intelligence operations. There were other problems. Intelligence gathered by Eighth Army intelligence units stopped at Eighth Army G-2 with only "confirmed" intelligence going to Far East Command. Information gathered by air force technical intelligence detachments went to Fifth Air Force, where it suffered much the same fate as information going to Eighth Army. The breakdown in intelligence sharing between the services came to light in late November when Far East Command convened a joint services board to find out how and why FECOM was caught short when the Chinese entered the war.