칸트 ≪윤리(도덕)형이상학≫＜덕론＞에서의 Gewissen의 내부법정은 허구인가? — F. Ishikawa의 ‘양심법정설’ 논의를 중심으로 —

Abstract

In The Metaphysics of Morals‚ Kant defines conscience as an “inner moral court of judgement” in human beings. However‚ there is a hazard of metaphor‚ if the inner judicial proceeding of conscience is inaptly compared with an external court of law. Therefore‚ Kant’s inner moral court system merely become a fiction by acknowledging the misinterpreted notion of court metaphor. I will discuss the above mentioned problem and resolve the conflicting dilemma in this paper. I will proceed by first discussing the definition of conscious of inner-court in the context of conscience as defined by Kant in the first chapter(verse 13) of The Metaphysics of Morals. Second；second by proving that the inner court system is not a fiction‚ as verified in Ishikawa’s the Court of Conscience Theory. From this discussion‚ we will understand that the Kant’s inner-court of judgement comes from St. Paul and the concept originate from Baumgarten. I will further explain that Kant was able to equate conscience to the metaphor of court by using the definition of inner-court and external-court of judgement. In other words‚ I argue that metaphor of court is no longer a fiction‚ but rather becomes an important historical reality. I will verify that there was a significant historical origin to the external court of law‚ not as a mere metaphor‚ through the Witness Oath. Finally‚ I will end the discussion by identifying an area of reconsideration amongst Ishikawa’s statements regarding oneself and double self.