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한국 헌법재판소와 미국 연방대법원의 헌법해석의 비교연구

The Comparative Study of Constitutional Interpretation between Korea Constitutional Court and United States America Federal Supreme Court

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주제분류법학

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이 글은 미국 연방대법원과 한국 헌법재판소의 주요 헌법판례의 동향에 대하여 비교 고찰한다. 우선, 215년 동안 미국 연방대법원은 공식 사법제도로서 헌법해석을 통하여 의회와 대통령 및 연방(주) 정부 간의 권력분립과 효율적인 정부구조의 연방주의를 달성하고, 나아가미국의 민주주의와 법치주의 그리고 시민의 인권신장에 기여하고 있다. 연방대법원이 대통령의 정치적 영향력을 희석시키는 사법제도로서 헌법해석방법에 의하여 권력분립원칙과연방주의에 관한 판례의 변화를 살펴본다. 한편, 지난 30년 동안 헌법재판소는 민주주의와 법치주의를 확립하는 헌법판례로서 인간존엄과 자유권적 기본권을 복원하는 동시에, 민주주의와 실질적 국민주권의 회복과 대통령탄핵심판 나아가 관습헌법을 이유로 권력분립에 반하는 헌법해석을 선고하였다. 아직 잔존한 권위적인 정치(헌법) 문화 아래에서 국회나 대통령의 정치적 영향으로부터 헌법재판의 독립성을 확보하기 위해서는 미국 연방대법원의 헌법해석의 함의가 중요하다.

Abstract

This paper examines the comparative constitution on the major constitutional precedents between the United States Supreme Court and the Korean Constitutional Court. First, the US Supreme Court analyzes the impact on American society through 215 major constitutional precedents. The Constitutional interpretation of the Constitution as a limitation of the judiciary system that dilutes the political influence of the President, who is nominated by the Justices of Supreme Court, who have achieved the separation of power among the Congress, the President, and the Federal Government, and the federalism of efficient governance of Federal and State Governments., Second, the Constitutional Court has been restricting human dignity and fundamental rights as a constitutional precedent that establishes democracy and the rule of law, while restoring democracy and real sovereignty, as well as constitutional interpretation contrary to separation of powers was sentenced. The implication of the Constitutional interpretation of the Supreme Court is important to secure the independence of the Constitutional Court from the political influence of the National Assembly or the President under the still authoritarian political culture so far. The analysis focuses on the impacts and limitations of the Constitutional Court in these judgments. Finally, we may examine the implication of the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation toward to the Constitutional Court as a formal constraint.

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