공인(公人)에 대한 명예훼손법리의 함의(含意)와 그 한계- 미국의 ‘공인이론’에 대한 비판적 검토를 중심으로 -

Abstract

The ‘public figure’ is a term applied in the context of defamation actions (libel and slander) as well as invasion of privacy. This term carries significant meaning in determining the boundary between freedom of the press and personal rights. Particularly, in United States law, A public figure (such as a politician, celebrity, or business leader) cannot base a sample on incorrect harmful statements unless there is proof that the writer or publisher acted with ‘actual malice’ (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). The burden of proof in defamation actions is higher in the case of a public figure. This ‘Actual malice rule’ was set in 1964 by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. There are three status of public figure, (1) public official, (2) all-purpose public figure, meaning either a public official or any other person pervasively involved in public affairs, (3) a limited purpose public figure, meaning those who have “thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.” However, there are no clear standards for determining who public figure is in the law. More than all, in comparison with the ‘public concern’ criterion, The ‘public figure’ criterion is a rather obscure and not objective due to concept elements such as the spontaneity, the fair comparison of interests. Furthermore, because the current law and the Supreme court precedents adhere to a standard such as ‘public benefit’ and ‘considerable nature’ in determining the boundary between freedom of the press and personal rights, introducing the concept of ‘public figure’ and ‘Actual malice rule’ does not represent much for solving problems.