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Coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings

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주제분류경제학

초록

In the framework of multiple objects choice (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems) with separable preferences (weak ordering), we characterize a family of voting rules that satisfy coalitional strategy-proofness, which requires that no group of agents can benefit simultaneously by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.

Abstract

In the framework of multiple objects choice (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems) with separable preferences (weak ordering), we characterize a family of voting rules that satisfy coalitional strategy-proofness, which requires that no group of agents can benefit simultaneously by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.

참고문헌 (7)

  1. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions", 18, pp.619~653 (2001)
  2. "Voting by comittees", eco(metrica59), pp.595~609 (1991)
  3. "Manipulation of voting scheme", eco(metrica 41), pp.587~602 (1973)
  4. "A characterization strategy-prof voting rules for separable weak or" (2003)
  5. "On the fair and coalition-strategyproof allocation of private goods Frontiers of Game Theory" (1993), The MITPress
  6. "existence and correspondencetheorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions"
  7. "Strategy-proof allocation rules on economic domains" (2001), University of Rochester, mimeo

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