Feasible Bayesian Implementation When Endowments are Unknown: A Case of Public Goods Economy
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In this paper, we study a feasible Bayesian implementation problem for exchange economies with public goods when preferences are known but endowments unknown. We show that for exchange economies with public goods and at least three agents, a social choice rule can be implemented by a feasible mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if it is Bayesian monotonic and Bayesian incentive compatible.
Abstract
In this paper, we study a feasible Bayesian implementation problem for exchange economies with public goods when preferences are known but endowments unknown. We show that for exchange economies with public goods and at least three agents, a social choice rule can be implemented by a feasible mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if it is Bayesian monotonic and Bayesian incentive compatible.
참고문헌 (14)
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