Strategy-Proof Risk Sharing for Uncertainty Averse Preferences
2
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
We consider a model of state-contingent goods allocation. Each agent has a set of beliefs, or priors, and evaluates an allocation according to the minimum expected utility over the set of priors. We study allocation rules that satisfy efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness (no one can benefit by misrepresenting his preferences). In the aggregate certainty case, the three axioms are compatible and we characterize the non-empty family of rules which contains both Walrasian and non-Walrasian rules. In the aggregate uncertainty case, we show in the 2-agent and 2-state case that the three axioms may or may not be compatible, depending on existence of a degenerate prior.
Abstract
We consider a model of state-contingent goods allocation. Each agent has a set of beliefs, or priors, and evaluates an allocation according to the minimum expected utility over the set of priors. We study allocation rules that satisfy efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness (no one can benefit by misrepresenting his preferences). In the aggregate certainty case, the three axioms are compatible and we characterize the non-empty family of rules which contains both Walrasian and non-Walrasian rules. In the aggregate uncertainty case, we show in the 2-agent and 2-state case that the three axioms may or may not be compatible, depending on existence of a degenerate prior.
참고문헌 (15)
- Billot, A., "Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing", Econometrica, 68, pp.685~694 (2000)
- Chateauneuf, A., "Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, pp.191~214 (2000)
- Dasgupta, P., "The implementation of social choice rules", Review of Economic Studies, 46, pp.153~170 (1979)
- Gibbard, A., "Manipulation of voting scheme: a general result", Econometrica, 41, pp.587~602 (1973)
- Gilboa, I., "Maximin expected utility with non-unique prior", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, pp.141~153 (1989)
- Hurwicz, L., "On informationally decentralized systems in Decision and Organization", pp.297~336 (1972), North-Holland
- Ju, B.-G., "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: general domain properties and applications", Social Choice and Welfare, 21, pp.73~93 (2003)
- Ju, B.-G., "Strategy-proof risk sharing", Games and Economic Behavior, 50, pp.225~254 (2005)
- Mas-Colell, A., "Microeconomic Theory" (1995), Oxford University Press
- Satterthwaite, M., "Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions", Journal of Economic Theory, 10, pp.187~217 (1975)
- Satterthwaite, M., "Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms at differentiable points", Review of Economic Studies, 48, pp.587~597 (1981)
- Schummer, J., "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies", Social Choice and Welfare, 14, pp.47~56 (1997)
- Serizawa, S., "Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies", J. Econ. Theory, 106, pp.219~241 (2002)
- Serizawa, S., "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees", J. Econ. Theory, 109, pp.246~263 (2003)
- Zhou, L., "Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies", Social Choice and Welfare, 8, pp.247~254 (1991)