ISP기업간 상호접속모형 : 동등접속과 네트워크 용향에 대한 투자를 중심으로
A Study on Internet Interconnection : Peering and the Investment of Network Capacity
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초록
1990년대 중반이후 인터넷 접속제공기업들(ISP) 사이에 상호접속의 주요 방식이 되고 있는 동등접속계약에 대해서 그 체결메커니즘을 네트워크 용량에 대한 투자를 중심으로 살펴본다. 네트워크 용량을 맹약이 있는 협조적 체제하에서 선택하든지 혹은 비협조적으로 선택하는지에 관계없이 시장의 규모가 충분히 크다면 두 기업간에 동등접속계약을 체결하는 것이 내쉬균형(Nash Equilibrium)이 될 수 있음을 보였다. 또한 네트워크 용량을 맹약이 있는 협조적 체제하에서 선택하는 동등접속(peering with commitment)이 비협조적으로 선택하는 동등접속(peering without commitment)보다 사회후생수준이 더 크다는 것을 보였다. 정책적으로 보았을 때, ISP기업간 합병에 관한 제한이나 불허와 같은 규제는 최종재라고 할 수 있는 가입자수에 대한 규제로 국한시키고 가능한 네트워크 용량의 선택에 있어서는 인터넷 접속제공 기업들의 협조적인 조율이 있을 수 있도록 유도해야 할 것이다.
Abstract
This study analysed the peering contracts, which have been a main method of internet interconnection among internet service providers(ISP) since mid 1990. In duopoly model, if ISP firms interconnect without network capacity commitment, ISP firms would choose less network capacity under peering contract than not peering irrespectively of market size and the important value of interconnection. On the other hand, when two ISP firms cooperatively choose the network capacity with commitment and market size is sufficiently large, we proposed ISP firms would choose the more network capacity under peering contract than not peering. We show that if market size is enough large, peering contracting can be Nash Equilibrium irrespective of commitment about network capacity. In other words, each ISP firms have the incentive of peering contract in equilibrium. But it would be Nash Equilibrium that two ISP firms would not peer with each other having the fixed cost on peering. We showed it would be socially dominant equilibrium that two ISP firms would peer with each other under commitment on network capacity choice. A policy making point of view, we propose the regulation of government on internet service industry should include internet peering between ISP firms. In other words, the peering contract between similar sized ISP firms should be institutionally guaranteed by regulation government. Also, we showed that social welfare would be larger under cooperative regime than noncooperative regime on choosing network capacity. Therefore, regulation government must carefully think about the importance of cooperation selecting network capacity, but regulation about ISP industry should be restricted within merger and acquisition which is said to be the regulation about final commodity.
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