강한 자기선택을 지닌 배분규칙의 실행
Implementation of Allocation Rule with Strict Self-Selection
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초록
본 연구는 대리인들이 준선형 선호를 갖는 환경에서 배분규칙의 베이지안 실행 문제를 살펴본다. 사전확률분포가 대리인들간에는 공통지식(common Knowledge)이나 주인은 이를 알지 못한다고 가정한 후 실행문제를 분석한다. 이때 대리인의 유형이 독립인 사전확률분포를 갖는 경우, 강한 자기선택(SSS)을 갖는 배분규칙은 완전 베이즈 균형(Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium)으로 실행할 수 있음을 보였다. 그러나 대리인들의 유형이 상관된 사전확률분포를 갖는 경우 이러한 결과는 유지될 수 없음을 보였다. 따라서 이러한 경우 실행을 위한 충분조건을 제시한다.
Abstract
This paper deals with the Bayesian implementation of an allocation rule in an environment with quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the implementation under the assumption that the principal does not know the prior distribution of agents' types, though the distribution is common knowledge among agents. Assuming that the agents types are independent prior distributions, we show that an allocation rule with SSS can be fully implemented in perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, in the case of dependent prior distribution of agents types, we show that this result cannot hold. Hence, we suggest the sufficient condition for implementation.
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