Coarse Information Leads to Less Effective Signaling
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Thisstudyconsidersfirms’coarseinformationaboutaworker’spossible types in Spence’s (1973) job market signaling model. Using incentive compatibility constraints appropriate to coarse information, we derive perfect Bayesian equilibria, which are refined into a unique equilibrium by invoking an extension of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion. In the unique refined equilibrium, a high-type worker may acquire a higher education level with a lower wage than in Spence’s (1973) model. This implies that education signaling may be less effective signal when firms have coarse information about a worker’s possible types compared to that in Spence (1973).
Abstract
Thisstudyconsidersfirms’coarseinformationaboutaworker’spossible types in Spence’s (1973) job market signaling model. Using incentive compatibility constraints appropriate to coarse information, we derive perfect Bayesian equilibria, which are refined into a unique equilibrium by invoking an extension of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion. In the unique refined equilibrium, a high-type worker may acquire a higher education level with a lower wage than in Spence’s (1973) model. This implies that education signaling may be less effective signal when firms have coarse information about a worker’s possible types compared to that in Spence (1973).
참고문헌 (23)
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