정부와 NGO 간의 갈등관계에 대한 이론적 분석모형의 탐색

Abstract

In modern society, conflict is a universal phenomenon. Recent social conflicts in Korean society vary widely, ranging from macro issues such as the promotion of national projects to micro-real life such as Me Too movement. This study presents a game-theoretical model that explains the interaction between opposing forces in the conflict structure with the background of frequent conflict situations in a society. In other words, it provides an economic analysis framework for analyzing the interactions between mutually conflicting forces and the societal spillover effects, rather than the consciousness of such problems in the existing social science literature, such as the causes of social conflicts and their solutions. In our model, conflict becomes a game situation because the strategies between players are interdependent, and therefore the analysis follows the game-based methodology. Therefore, the focus of the discussion in this study is on a technical analysis model rather than on any realistic implications. The results of several comparative statics are derived from the basic model. Some of our findings are consistent with our intuition, but others are uncertain. The ambiguity of the result is due to the model's technical assumption, and it can be seen that it relies on assumption about the rate of change in reward for NGOs fighting against the government over social issues. This, in turn, means that the ambiguity of the results could be eliminated by relaxing the model's assumptions based on a number of specific cases of hostile conflict. Therefore, our analysis model can be applied to various conflict cases. It is believed that this analytical model could extend the results of existing relevant studies or provide a logical explanation of the unusual phenomena of reality.