협조적 게임이론을 이용한 국가 간 수산자원관리에 관한 연구
A Study on the Management of International Fishery Resources using Cooperative Game Theory
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This study demonstrates that cooperative management can provide more benefits than non-cooperative management for Korea and Japan fishery. We have studied one management strategy, namely, fishing under joint maximization of net benefits in coastal waters of two countries, using a cooperative game theory. The present net return under non-cooperation amounts to 420,255 million won. However, if two countries cooperate one with another, this figure can get to 2,636,565 million won. We consider this to be an important conclusion as close management relationships have developed between the two countries since the establishment of the EEZ in 1996. The results of the study can also help balance resource conservation and the appropriate catch quota in each country.
Abstract
This study demonstrates that cooperative management can provide more benefits than non-cooperative management for Korea and Japan fishery. We have studied one management strategy, namely, fishing under joint maximization of net benefits in coastal waters of two countries, using a cooperative game theory. The present net return under non-cooperation amounts to 420,255 million won. However, if two countries cooperate one with another, this figure can get to 2,636,565 million won. We consider this to be an important conclusion as close management relationships have developed between the two countries since the establishment of the EEZ in 1996. The results of the study can also help balance resource conservation and the appropriate catch quota in each country.
참고문헌 (14)
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