Responding to North Korean Provocations: Limitations of Sanctions
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Over the past two decades, economic sanctions and inducements to influence North Korea have not always failed, but the successes have been limited and the obstacles to effectiveness have grown. In general, the application of economic leverage will only be successful if the costs to the target of defying the demands of the sanctioning country or coalition outweigh the costs that the targeted regime perceives it will bear from complying with those demands. Among the factors affecting those costs are the potential economic and political leverage the sanctioner has over the target, the willingness and ability to use that leverage effectively, and the risks that the sanctioner’s demands pose for the target in terms of wealth, power, or political stability and survival. With respect to the sanctions imposed after the sinking of the Cheonan naval ship, only the United States and South Korea took action and it was fairly limited. Even if the sanctions were only intended to punish the North and to send a signal that such behavior would carry a price, the shelling of Yeonpyeong island in November is a further setback.
Abstract
Over the past two decades, economic sanctions and inducements to influence North Korea have not always failed, but the successes have been limited and the obstacles to effectiveness have grown. In general, the application of economic leverage will only be successful if the costs to the target of defying the demands of the sanctioning country or coalition outweigh the costs that the targeted regime perceives it will bear from complying with those demands. Among the factors affecting those costs are the potential economic and political leverage the sanctioner has over the target, the willingness and ability to use that leverage effectively, and the risks that the sanctioner’s demands pose for the target in terms of wealth, power, or political stability and survival. With respect to the sanctions imposed after the sinking of the Cheonan naval ship, only the United States and South Korea took action and it was fairly limited. Even if the sanctions were only intended to punish the North and to send a signal that such behavior would carry a price, the shelling of Yeonpyeong island in November is a further setback.
참고문헌 (13)
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