What's New? Comparing the February 13 Action Plan with the Agreed Framework
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The February 13 Action Plan represents the lowest common denominator for the parties involved. In agreeing to the plan, all parties made minimum necessary concessions, and gained minimum satisfactory outcome. North Korea succeeded in bringing the United States back on the engagement track, but it had to freeze the important part of its nuclear facilities and be satisfied with a much smaller aid package than under the Agreed Framework. China and South Korea successfully persuaded the United States to come back on the engagement track. But to compensate for the US concession, China had to provide strong political leadership, and South Korea had to show its willingness to shoulder the financial burden involved in implementing the Action Plan. Japan was upset by the shift in the US position, but the Action Plan was not totally a bad thing for Japan since it could have North Korea’s nuclear facilities frozen without making substantial financial contributions as it did under the Agreed Framework. The objective of this article is to make a preliminary evaluation of the Action Plan by comparing it with the October 1994 Agreed Framework and, more broadly, comparing the first phase of North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy in 1993-1994 with the second phase, which started in 2003.
Abstract
The February 13 Action Plan represents the lowest common denominator for the parties involved. In agreeing to the plan, all parties made minimum necessary concessions, and gained minimum satisfactory outcome. North Korea succeeded in bringing the United States back on the engagement track, but it had to freeze the important part of its nuclear facilities and be satisfied with a much smaller aid package than under the Agreed Framework. China and South Korea successfully persuaded the United States to come back on the engagement track. But to compensate for the US concession, China had to provide strong political leadership, and South Korea had to show its willingness to shoulder the financial burden involved in implementing the Action Plan. Japan was upset by the shift in the US position, but the Action Plan was not totally a bad thing for Japan since it could have North Korea’s nuclear facilities frozen without making substantial financial contributions as it did under the Agreed Framework. The objective of this article is to make a preliminary evaluation of the Action Plan by comparing it with the October 1994 Agreed Framework and, more broadly, comparing the first phase of North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy in 1993-1994 with the second phase, which started in 2003.