Russia’s Policy in Northeast Asia and the Prospects for Korean Unification

Abstract

Russia’s policy towards Northeast Asia cannot be understood independently of its general Asian strategy, primarily its pivot to Asia, which has practically become an official policy after 2014. There are various views about when this pivot actually began. Some see it in the distant past; others claim it dates back to the second half of the 1990s when Russia’s leadership became disappointed with the one-sided policy of the West; still others link it to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Russia’s general strategy is based on the fact that the international system is gravitating towards multipolarity. It is trying to create its own independent Eurasian center of power in the multipolar world of the future and build constructive and equidistant relations with other major powers. For Russia, the maintenance of security and stability in East Asia is not only a foreign policy goal, it directly involves the resolution of an internal strategic problem—the development of its Far Eastern regions. It will be easier for Russia to deal with the new “leftist” government in Seoul. Most Russian experts do not share the opinion of some of their Western colleagues who expect an imminent collapse of the North Korean regime. It is hard to say what the relationship between Russia and the United States will be like. On the whole, it is clear that Russia will continue to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. It will have no major objections to reunification and, regardless of its confrontation with the West, will closely work on this issue with China, which is unlikely to be happy about reunification for its own reasons.