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하마스의 제도권 진입 이후의 전략과 행태의 변화

Changes of Hamas's Strategies and Behaviour after its Entrance into Palestinian Mainstream Politics

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Hamas, a Palestinian radical Islamic movement, has succeeded in developing and building an electoral base in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and has won the Palestinian legislative election in January 2006. In June 2007, Hamas seized key security installations of the Fatah in Gaza Strip. Since then, it is a de facto ruling power which plays an exclusive state authority. After the 2006 legislative election, Hamas leaders in both Gaza and Damascus, have alluded a peaceful resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by expressing more flexible positions on the fundamental issues of the conflict. Neither they use the words of the destruction of Israel nor the establishment of Islamic Palestinian state in the whole Palestine replacing Israel. They do not object to the third party mediation on the terms of opening peace talks. Hamas's attitudes concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been moderated in some extent after the 2006 election. Hamas leaders, however, never agreed to recognize the State of Israel and did not give up the ultimate goal of the liberation of the whole land of Palestine. They consider a long-term Hudna, or cease-fire as an intermediary phase of the liberation process. Since its entering in the mainstream Palestinian politics, Hamas has shown some indications that it has ceased to be a fanatic and terrorist organization. Therefore, some of its positions contradicted to the 1988 Hamas Charter. This change signals a positive development of Hamas as a ruling party in the mainstream Palestinian politics, and it's successful adjustment in the dynamic interactions among the Palestinian constituency and international actors. Hamas was able to bridge between its fundamentalist dogma and pragmatic considerations. Hamas's control of the government apparatuses is also impressive. From courts, educational establishments to municipalities, Hamas succeeded to almost complete control of institutions. Gaza's takeover transformed the Qassam Brigades from an underground guerrilla organization into a uniformed military force. It was one of the most symbolic developments. Notwithstanding its casualties in the 2008-2009 Gaza war, Hamas security forces have functioned effectively. Due to this, many Arab neighboring countries appreciate them positively. It seems that Hamas security forces have a capability to control other militant Islamist groups and it could be an important asset for Hamas in the relations with international actors in general and with Israel in particular. The Islamization process, designed to further its vision of establishing a Palestinian state based on Islamic religious law, was accelerated following Hamas's exclusive control of Gaza in 2007. However, there are clear internal differences in the movement regarding the pace of change. Hamas's current leadership, especially that of Khaled Meshaal, has tended to favor a slow encouragement of Islamic practices and rules. More hardline elements within the movement and senior religious officials in the bureaucracy want a stricter and more formal introduction of Islamic norms. Events over the last two years indicate that the latter group is now making the running, with Hamas's leadership under pressure from extreme forces both within the movement and beyond it.

Abstract

Hamas, a Palestinian radical Islamic movement, has succeeded in developing and building an electoral base in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and has won the Palestinian legislative election in January 2006. In June 2007, Hamas seized key security installations of the Fatah in Gaza Strip. Since then, it is a de facto ruling power which plays an exclusive state authority. After the 2006 legislative election, Hamas leaders in both Gaza and Damascus, have alluded a peaceful resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by expressing more flexible positions on the fundamental issues of the conflict. Neither they use the words of the destruction of Israel nor the establishment of Islamic Palestinian state in the whole Palestine replacing Israel. They do not object to the third party mediation on the terms of opening peace talks. Hamas's attitudes concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been moderated in some extent after the 2006 election. Hamas leaders, however, never agreed to recognize the State of Israel and did not give up the ultimate goal of the liberation of the whole land of Palestine. They consider a long-term Hudna, or cease-fire as an intermediary phase of the liberation process. Since its entering in the mainstream Palestinian politics, Hamas has shown some indications that it has ceased to be a fanatic and terrorist organization. Therefore, some of its positions contradicted to the 1988 Hamas Charter. This change signals a positive development of Hamas as a ruling party in the mainstream Palestinian politics, and it's successful adjustment in the dynamic interactions among the Palestinian constituency and international actors. Hamas was able to bridge between its fundamentalist dogma and pragmatic considerations. Hamas's control of the government apparatuses is also impressive. From courts, educational establishments to municipalities, Hamas succeeded to almost complete control of institutions. Gaza's takeover transformed the Qassam Brigades from an underground guerrilla organization into a uniformed military force. It was one of the most symbolic developments. Notwithstanding its casualties in the 2008-2009 Gaza war, Hamas security forces have functioned effectively. Due to this, many Arab neighboring countries appreciate them positively. It seems that Hamas security forces have a capability to control other militant Islamist groups and it could be an important asset for Hamas in the relations with international actors in general and with Israel in particular. The Islamization process, designed to further its vision of establishing a Palestinian state based on Islamic religious law, was accelerated following Hamas's exclusive control of Gaza in 2007. However, there are clear internal differences in the movement regarding the pace of change. Hamas's current leadership, especially that of Khaled Meshaal, has tended to favor a slow encouragement of Islamic practices and rules. More hardline elements within the movement and senior religious officials in the bureaucracy want a stricter and more formal introduction of Islamic norms. Events over the last two years indicate that the latter group is now making the running, with Hamas's leadership under pressure from extreme forces both within the movement and beyond it.

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