기업의 소유구조와현금보유간의 관계
The Relations between Ownership Structure and Cash Holdings of Firms
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본 연구는 1997년 1월 1일부터 2008년 12월 31일까지 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 소유구조와 현금보유간의 관계를 실증분석 하였으며, 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 대주주 지분율이 클수록 대주주들이 이사회 참여를 통한 경영권 통제 등을 통하여 수익성이 낮은 현금보유를 증가시키는 방향으로 소액주주의 이익을 침해할 수 있다. 1대주주와 2대주주 간의 지분율 차이가 증가할수록, 그리고 대주주들 간의 소유집중도가 증가할수록 현금보유가 증가한다. 그리고 경영자지분율은 현금보유에 비선형적으로 영향을 미친다. 다시 말해, 경영자지분율이 낮은 단계에서는 이익침해가설에 따라 현금보유에 양(+)의 영향을 미치지만, 경영자지분율이 일정 수준 이상으로 증가하면 이해일치가설에 따라 음(-)의 영향을 미치며, 경영자지분율이 매우 높은 수준으로 증가하면 다시 이익침해가설에 따라 양(+)의 영향을 미친다. 그리고 소유자지배기업은 경영자지배기업보다 대주주들이 현금보유에 미치는 영향력이 상대적으로 증가하여 현금보유를 증가시킬 수 있다. 이러한 결과는 한국기업의 현금보유는 주로 상충이론과 자금조달순서 이론으로 설명할 수 있으나, 대리인 이론으로도 부분적으로 설명할 수 있으며, 이는 대주주들이 소액주주와 균등한 혜택이 분배되는 재무정책을 기피하고 소액주주의 희생 하에 사적 이익을 취할 가능성이 있음을 시사한다. 따라서 우리나라에서도 대주주가 소액주주의 이익을 침해하는 행위를 예방하고, 소액주주의 이익을 보호할 수 있는 제도적 장치와 소유집중도를 완화시킬 수 있는 소유구조 정책이 필요하다고 생각한다.
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder’s equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder’s and second largest shareholder’s equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder’s equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms’ other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.
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