대주주 지분이 타인자본비용에 미치는 영향 : 대주주-채권자 갈등의 효과를 중심으로
Impact of Blockholder Ownership on the Cost of Debt : How does the Conflict between Blockholders and Creditors Change the Relation?
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초록
본 연구는 대주주 지분과 타인자본비용 간의 관계가 대주주-채권자 갈등을 높이는 기업특성에 의해 어떻게 달라지는지 조사한다. 분석 결과, 개인 대주주 지분의 상승 또는 외국인 주주의 존재는 타인자본비용 하락에 기여하지만 높은 타인자본의존도, 낮은 성장성, 또는 약한 주주권한 특성을 가지는 기업에서는 타인자본비용 하락에 대한 대주주 지분의 기여도가 약화되거나 오히려 타인자본비용 상승을 초래한다. 타인자본의존도가 높거나 성장성이 낮은 기업에서는 확정된 선순위청구권을 보유한 채권자와 잔여 가치에 대해 콜옵션을 보유한 주주간의 갈등이 높을 가능성이 있다. 또한 주주권리 보호가 약한 기업에서는 외부 투자자인 채권자와 경영에 영향을 행사하는 내부자인 대주주간 갈등이 높을 수 있다. 따라서 본 연구결과는 대주주 지분 강화 시 자본제공자인 대주주의 경영자감시기능에 의해 평균적으로 기업의 채무이행능력이 강화되지만, 상기 특성을 가진 기업들에서는 대주주 지분 강화 시 채권자이익 침해에 대한 우려가 높기 때문에 채무이행능력 제고에 미치는 대주주 지분의 긍정적인 영향력이 상대적으로 약해지거나 대주주 지분 강화가 오히려 기업의 채무이행능력 약화를 초래한다는 실증적 근거를 제시한다.
Abstract
This paper examines how the relation between block ownership and cost of debt changes along with the firm characteristics. According to the results, increase in large individual shareholders’ ownership or the existence of foreign investors contributes to reducing the cost of debt in general, but in a firm with high leverage, low growth opportunities, or weak shareholder rights, such contribution is weakened or block ownership even leads to the higher cost of debt. High leverage or low growth opportunities can increase the conflict between the creditors, who hold senior fixed claim, and the blockholders, who hold a call option on the firm value. Weak protection of shareholder rights can increase conflict between the creditors, who are outside investors, and the blockholders, who are corporate insiders. The results provide the empirical evidence that in an average firm the effect of management monitoring by blockholders is dominant to enhance a firm’s capability to repay debt but in firms with above characteristics the creditors’ concern over the transfer of wealth from creditors to blockholders grows as the block ownership increases, so that the decrease of the cost of debt by blockholder ownership is weakened or blockholder ownership rather increases the cost of debt.
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