집중투표제에 관한 연구 - 미국에서의 찬반론을 중심으로 -
A Study on the Cumulative Voting -Focusing on Supporting and Dissenting Opinions in the USA-
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
먼저 집중투표제 반대론의 논거는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 집중투표제는 회사의비용을 사용하면서도, 주주를 포함한 모든 회사이해관계자를 위해서가 아닌, 특정 이익집단만을 위해서 잘못 사용되는 문제점이 있다. 둘째, 집중투표제는회사를 인수합병의 위험에 취약하게 만들며, 경쟁회사가 기밀을 탈취하는 수단으로 악용될 수 있고, 소수주주가 자신이 선임한 이사를 통해 회사의 중요정보를 빼내는 수단으로 악용될 수 있다. 셋째, 집중투표제는 이사회를 대주주측 이사들과 소수주주측 이사들로 양극화시킴으로써 오히려 회사지배력으로부터 경영진을 차단시키는 효과를 통해 경영진의 지위를 공고히 시키게 하는 문제를 발생시킨다. 넷째, 집중투표제를 이용하려는 소수주주들로 인하여 위임장경쟁이 촉발되게 되는데, 특히 경영진이 회사에서의 그들의 지위를 이용하여회사의 비용을 사용함으로써 만일 경영진이 위임장경쟁에서 승리할 경우 사실상 사용된 회사비용이 패배한 소수주주들에게 전가되는 문제를 발생시킬 수있다. 다섯째, 집중투표제는 소수주주가 집중하여 투표할 수 있는 주식수와 이사회의 이사정원수에 그 효용성이 달려있기 때문에 궁극적으로 소수주주를 효율적으로 보호해왔다고 볼 수 없다. 다음으로 집중투표제 찬성론의 논거는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 집중투표제는 기본적으로 공정에 근거한다. 즉, 주주는 자신이 속한 회사에 중요한 이해관계를가지는 경우 소유지분에 비례하여 이사회에 자신을 대표할 자를 선임할 기회가 부여되는 것이 형평의 원칙에 맞는다. 둘째, 집중투표제는 그 존재자체만으로도 소수주주의 견해와 이해관계를 주장할 잠재적인 힘을 보여주게 됨으로써이사들에 대한 견제수단으로 작용할 수 있다. 셋째, 집중투표제는 회사의 가치를 상승시키는데, 왜냐하면 집중투표제는 회사지배를 위한 시장의 기능을 촉진시키기 때문이다. 넷째, 집중투표제는 소수주주의 이익뿐만 아니라, 이사회에서의 정보공개를 통해 대중의 신뢰를 받게 됨으로써 공익에 실질적으로 기여한다. 다섯째, 간접적으로 경영진으로 하여금 이사회구성의 변화를 가져오게만드는 압박수단으로 작용하기도 하고, 인수합병 저지수단을 무력화시킬 수도있으며, 경영진 보수안을 수정시키는 등 경영진의 개혁을 촉발시키는 촉매제역할을 할 수도 있다. 검토해 보면, 위임장경쟁이 격화되는 등 반대론이 지적하는 바와 같은 문제점이 일부 있는 것은 인정되나, 소수주주가 존재할 수 밖에 없는 회사구조를만들었다면, 소수주주를 대표할 이사를 경영에 참여할 기회를 부여하는 집중투표제를 허용하는 것이 형평의 원칙에 맞으며, 이사회라는 경영결정제도하에서도 all or nothing이 아닌, 대주주든 소수주주든 각자의 소유비율에 따라 대리인을 참여시킬 권리를 민주주의 뿐만 아니라 자본주의 체제하에서도 보장하는 것이 옳다고 생각한다. 끝으로 소액주주들의 의사를 대변해 줄 이사를 이사회에 진출시킬 수 있는 기회를 제공해 줌으로써 더 많은 국민이 투자를 하도록 만들 수 있게 된다는 국민참여확대를 통한 자본주의의 건전한 발전이라는 공익적 가치를 감안할 때, 우리나라의 경우 많은 소액주주들이 있을 수 밖에 없는 상장회사만이라도, 최소한 지금처럼 집중투표제가 사문화되는 일은막아야 된다고 생각한다.
Abstract
The grounds of the dissenting opinion on a cumulative voting are as follows: First, the cumulative voting could be misused for the narrow interest of particular groups such as minority shareholders, not for all interest groups in the corporation including shareholders, at the expense of the corporation wholly. Next, the cumulative voting makes the corporation vulnerable to takeover and would become a device by which competing corporations could spy upon each other and could not preventing a minority member elected by minority shareholders from dispensing information about affairs of the corporation as a means of espionage. And, the cumulative voting can polarize the board and insulate managers from the full force of the market for corporate control and has the further property of impeding changes of control, thus supporting the position of managers. Furthermore, the use of cumulative voting would involve a fierce campaign of proxy solicitation. On the contrary, the grounds of the supporting opinion are as follows: First, the cumulative voting is basically fair. And, the cumulative voting, even if unused, represents potential power to assert shareholder points of view and interests, and thus it may act as a checking influence on the directors. Next, the cumulative voting is likely to be associated with higher firm value because minority shareholders can limit major shareholders’ opportunity to pursue private benefits that hurt firm value. Furthermore, the cumulative voting not only protects the interest of minority shareholders but was a substantial contribution to the public welfare where publicity about corporate proceedings is desirable for the public confidence. Finally, the cumulative voting may often intimidate management into changing the composition of the board, dismantling takeover defenses, revising executive compensation packages, and often provides an impetus for these types of reforms to bypass the cost and adverse publicity of the confrontation. In my view on the dissenting and supporting opinions, what I would like to mention first is that even if it could be admitted that several shortcomings including intensified competition of obtaining proxies on the cumulative voting exist, where minority shareholders should exist under the structure of corporation, it would be fair that the cumulative voting bestowing an opportunity to participate in the management on directors representing the minority shareholders should be allowed. In addition, to my way of thinking, it must be permitted that a right to make directors, agents of shareholders, regardless of majority or minority shareholders, participate in the management of the corporation proportionate to the ratio of ownership thereby is allowed. The last thing I want to assert is that considering a public value like a sound development of capitalism through an enlargement of people’s participation where more people could invest in the corporation by providing the minority shareholders with a chance for any director on behalf thereof to enter into the board of directors, I think that at least in the listed corporation where minority shareholders are going to exist, it should be guaranteed that the cumulative voting could be exercised whenever minority shareholders want.
참고문헌 (76)
- 강영기, "집중투표제 의무화의 당위성에 대한 재검토", 기업법연구, 33(4), pp.9~36 (2019), 한국기업법학회[DOI]
- 신찬호, "집중투표제 의무화에 관한 소고", 법이론실무연구, 7(4), pp.235~258 (2019), 사단법인 한국법이론실무학회
- Charles M. Williams, "Cumulative Voting for Directors" (1951), Harvard University
- Charles W. Gerstenberg, "Financial organization and management of business" (1957), Prentice-Hall, Inc
- Edward S. Herman, "Corporate Control, Corporate Power" (1981), Cambridge University Press
- Frank H. Easterbrook, "The Economic Structure of Corporate Law" (1991), Harvard University Press
- John R. Commons, "Legal Foundations of Capitalism" (1959), University of Wisconsin Press
- John Stuart Mill, "Representative Government" (2001), Batoche Books Litimited
- Leland C. Whetten, "Cumulative Voting for Directors : Its Origin and Significance" (1959), Bureau of Business and Economic Research, School of Business Administration, Georgia State College of Business Administration
- Max Bazerman, "Judgment in Managerial Decision Making" (1998), John, Wiley & Sons
- Rilka Dragneva, "Investor Protection in the CIS: Legal Reform and Voluntary Harmonization" (2007), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
- Robert Charles Clark, "Corporate Law" (1986), Aspen Publishers, Inc
- Barry M. Staw, "The Justification of Organizational Performance", Administrative Science Quarterly, 28(4) (1983), Sage Publications, Inc
- Benjamin Maury, "Multiple large shareholders and firm value", Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(7) (2005), Elsevier
- Bernard Black, "A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law", Harvard Law Review, 109(8) (1996)
- Bradley William Kragel, "Fear of the Hostile Takeover: Having Tamed and Reined the Beasts, State Regulation Would Kill Them as Well", Journal of Corporation Law, 14(1) (1988), University of Iowa
- Chao Xi, "Does Cumulative Voting Matter? The Case of China: An Empirical Assessment", European Business Organization Law Review, 15(4) (2014)
- Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, "Creative problem solving as a result of majority vs minority influence", European Journal of Social Psychology, 13(1) (1983), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
- Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, "Minority Influence, Divergent Thinking and Detection of Correct Solutions", Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 17(9) (1987), V. H. Winston & Sons, Ltd
- Charles M. Williams, "Cumulative Voting", Harvard Business Review, 33(3) (1955)
- Colin Camerer, "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach", American Economic Review, 89(1) (1999), American Economic Association
- Daniel R. Fischel, "The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Development in Delaware’s Corporation Law", Northwestern University Law Review, 76(6) (1982)
- Daniel P. Forbes, "Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups", Academy of Management Review, 24(3) (1999)
- David L. Ratner, "Government of Business Corporations Critical Reflections on the Rule of One Share One Vote", Cornell Law Review, 26(1) (1970)
- David Yermack, "Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance", Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2(1) (2010), Annual Reviews
- Debra R. Cohen, "West Virginia Corporate Law: Is It "Broke"?", Virginia Law Review, 100(1) (1997)
- Eugene F. Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy, 88(2) (1980), University of Chicago Press
- Eugene F. Fama, "Separation of Ownership and Control", Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2) (1983), University of Chicago
- Frank H. Easterbrook, "Voting in Corporate Law", Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2) (1983), University of Chicago Press
- Gainan Avilov, "General Principles of Company Law for Transition Economies", Journal of Corporation Law, 24(2) (1999)
- George H. Young, "The Case for Cumulative Voting", Wisconsin Law Review, 1950(1) (1950)
- Gerald J. Glasser, "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting for Corporate Directors", Management Science, 5(2) (1959)
- Gershon Mandelker, "Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms", Journal of Financial Economics, 1(4) (1974), North-Holland Publishing Company
- Harles W. Steadman, "Should Cumulative Voting For Directors Be Mandatory? - A Debate", Business Lawyer, 11(1) (1955), American Bar Association
- Harlowe E. Bowes, "Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations", Minesota Law Review, 21(4) (1937)
- Harry DeAngelo, "Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly held Corporations", Journal of Financial Economics, 23(1) (1989), Elsevier
- Henry G. Manne, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", Journal of Political Economy, 73(2) (1965), University of Chicago Press
- Herbert F. Sturdy, "Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism", Business Lawyer, 16(3) (1961), American Bar Association
- James M. Mahoney, "An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Corporate Charter Antitakeover Amendments on Stockholder Wealth", Strategic Management Journal, 14(1) (1993), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
- Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting", Columbia Law Review, 94(1) (1994)
- J. Harold Mulherin, "Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth", Journal of Financial Economics, 47(3) (1998), Elsevier
- Jiatao Li, "Principal-Principal Conflicts under Weak Iinstitutions: A Study of Corporate Takeovers in China", Strategic Management Journal (2012), John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
- John F. Coyle, "Altering Rules, Cumulative Voting, and Venture", Utah Law Review, 2016(4) (2016)
- John G. Sobieski, "In Support of Cumulative Voting", Business Lawyer, 15(2) (1960), American Bar Association
- June A. Striegel, "Cumulative Voting, Yesterday and Today: The July, 1986 Amendments to Ohio’s General Corporation Law", University of Cincinnati Law Review, 55(4) (1987)
- Lisa F. Borstadt, "The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance", Financial Management, 21(3) (1992), John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- Max H. Bazerman, "Escalation of Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making", Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 33 (1984), Academic Press, Inc
- Michael E. Murphy, "Assuring Responsible Risk Management in Banking:The Corporate Governance Dimension", Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 36(1) (2011)
- Miguel A. Ferreira, "Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow", Journal of Finance, 62(2) (2007), American Finance Association
- The State of Corporate Governance: Experience from Country Assessments, "Olivier Fremond", World Bank, ~ (2002)
- Paul Gompers, "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1) (2003), Oxford University Press
- Peter Dodd, "On Corporate G overnance: A Study of Proxy Contest", Journal of Financial Economics, 11(1–4) (1983), Elsevier Science Publishers
- Rafael La Porta, "Law and Finance", Journal of Political Economy, 106(6) (1998), University of Chicago Press
- Ralph E. Axley, "The Case against Cumulative Voting", Wisconsin Law Review, 1950(2) (1950)
- Randall S. Peterson, "Focus Vesus Flexibility:Majority and Minority Influence Can Both Improve Performance", Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(1) (1996)
- Sanjai Bhagat, "Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Right", Journal of Law & Economics, 27(2) (1984), University of Chicago
- Susan A. Rose, "Optional Cumulative Voting & Staggered Terms of Directors: Is the California Climate Warming to Corporations?", San Diego Law Review, 27(2) (1990)
- Whitney Campbell, "The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors", Business Lawyer, 10(3) (1955), American Bar Association
- Yiyi Su, "Principal–Principal Conflict in the Governance of the Chinese Public Corporation", Management and Organization Review, 4(1) (2008), Blackwell Publishing Ltd
- Yugang Chen, "Cumulative Voting:Investor Protection or Antitakeover? Evidence from Family Firms in China", Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23(3) (2015), John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- Yu-Hsin Lin, "Does Mandating Cumulative Voting Weaken Controlling Shareholders? A Difference-in-differences Approach", International Review of Law and Economics, 52 (2017), Elsevier
- Zhonghui"Hugo"Wang, "Turf war or collusion: An empirical investigation of conflict of interest between large hareholders", Corporate Governance: An International Review, 25(5) (2017), John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- "Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1367 (Ill. 1984)", ~ (1984)
- 공정거래위원회, "2022년 공시대상기업집단 지배구조 현황 분석", ~ (2022)
- "대한민국 21대국회 입법예고 의안번호: 2100631, 2104288, 2104406, 2107191", ~
- 집중투표제 관련 현황 및 쟁점, "방문옥", ~, pp.ESG 동향 8권 3호 (2018)
- "연합뉴스" (2022)[URL]
- E.L. Merritt, "Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Illinois", Convened at the City of Springfield, ~ (1870)
- Legislative Research Unit, "1970 Illinois Constitution Annotated For Legislators, Fourth Edition"
- OECD, "White Paper on Corporate Governance in Russia" (2002)
- Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes: Corporate Governance Country Assessment, Republic of the Philippines, "World Bank", ~ (2001)
- "미국 Missouri주 헌법"[URL]
- "미국 South Dakota주 헌법"[URL]
- "미국 California주 회사법"[URL]
- "미국 Minnesota주 회사법"[URL]
- "미국 Ohio주 회사법"[URL]