플라톤의 『소피스테스』에서 비존재(me-on)와 거짓진술의 문제
Me-on and False Statement in Plato's Sophist
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According to the Plato's earlier theory of Forms, Forms always exist kath' hauto. But if to exist kath' hauto means to have nothing to do with anything, we cannot think or say anything whatsoever, as we can see in the ontology of Parmenides. Therefore in Sophist says Plato through a stranger from Elea : “Because Forms are connected with one another, we have statements.” But someone will ask. ① Did Plato abandon his earlier theory of Forms in Sophist? ② Is a statement made up of Forms only? My answer to both the questions is negative. Logos(statement) is the combination of Onoma(name) and Rhema(verb). And Onoma can be Form, but may be Particular. Therefore types of Logos is divided into two : [Form+Form] & [Particular+Form]. Now we can define the false statement. The description characterizing the false statement is me-on peri X (not being about X), while the description characterizing the true statement is on peri X (being about X). Then what is the meaning of on and me-on here? In [Form+Form] statement, it is false that the Rest moves because the Rest can't be connected with the Motion en physei. Therefore in [Form+Form] statement, “me-on peri X” is the Form that isn't connected with X en physei, and the false statement here is the combination of Forms that can't be connected with one another. And it is false that Theaetetus is flying, because Theaetetus the Particular does not participate in <Flying>. So in [Particular+Form] statement, “me-on peri X” is the Form that X does not participate in, and the false statement here is the statement that refers to not-participating Form as participating. Finally we can conclude that in Sophist Plato does not abandon his earlier theory of Forms, but improves it.
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