국내외 비발전용 원자력시설 방사능방재 규제체계 비교 분석을 통한 국내 규제체계 한계점 도출
Identifying the Limitations of the Korean Regulatory Framework through a Comparative Analysis of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Systems for Non-Power Nuclear Facilities
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through GSR Part 7, recommended a gradedapproach to radiological emergency preparedness, requiring that protective actions be commensurate with thecharacteristics and risks of nuclear facilities. In contrast, the Korean Radiological Emergency Preparedness Actapplied a dichotomous framework based on facility size, without fully reflecting facility-specific risk. This studyaimed to compare international and domestic regulatory frameworks for non-power nuclear facilities to identifylimitations in the Korean system. Relevant legislation and regulatory documents from the United States, the UnitedKingdom, and Canada were reviewed and compared with the Korean framework. The results showed that theUnited States applied a two-tier emergency classification system to non-power facilities under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40,63, 70, 72, 76 and NRC Regulatory Guide 3.67, differentiated planning requirements by facility type, and allowedexemptions from emergency plan submission under defined conditions. The United Kingdom, under REPPIR 2019,used a risk-based assessment combining accident consequences and probabilities to determine planning levels, andspecified detailed exemption criteria. Canada, through REGDOC-2.10.1, required all Class I facilities to establishemergency plans within a four-tier classification system, while permitting adjustments in scope and rigor through agraded approach. By contrast, Korea applied a three-tier classification system but did not specify detailed declarationcriteria or provide exemption provisions, limiting rational regulatory differentiation. Accordingly, the Koreanregulatory framework for radiological emergency preparedness was found to have three major limitations: (1) thelack of exemption criteria for emergency planning based on facility risk, (2) the absence of established methodologiesfor facility-specific risk assessment, and (3) the lack of a review system for criteria to declare radiological emergencyclasses. These results provide a basis for establishing a graded, risk-informed regulatory framework for non-powernuclear facilities in Korea.
Abstract
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through GSR Part 7, recommended a gradedapproach to radiological emergency preparedness, requiring that protective actions be commensurate with thecharacteristics and risks of nuclear facilities. In contrast, the Korean Radiological Emergency Preparedness Actapplied a dichotomous framework based on facility size, without fully reflecting facility-specific risk. This studyaimed to compare international and domestic regulatory frameworks for non-power nuclear facilities to identifylimitations in the Korean system. Relevant legislation and regulatory documents from the United States, the UnitedKingdom, and Canada were reviewed and compared with the Korean framework. The results showed that theUnited States applied a two-tier emergency classification system to non-power facilities under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40,63, 70, 72, 76 and NRC Regulatory Guide 3.67, differentiated planning requirements by facility type, and allowedexemptions from emergency plan submission under defined conditions. The United Kingdom, under REPPIR 2019,used a risk-based assessment combining accident consequences and probabilities to determine planning levels, andspecified detailed exemption criteria. Canada, through REGDOC-2.10.1, required all Class I facilities to establishemergency plans within a four-tier classification system, while permitting adjustments in scope and rigor through agraded approach. By contrast, Korea applied a three-tier classification system but did not specify detailed declarationcriteria or provide exemption provisions, limiting rational regulatory differentiation. Accordingly, the Koreanregulatory framework for radiological emergency preparedness was found to have three major limitations: (1) thelack of exemption criteria for emergency planning based on facility risk, (2) the absence of established methodologiesfor facility-specific risk assessment, and (3) the lack of a review system for criteria to declare radiological emergencyclasses. These results provide a basis for establishing a graded, risk-informed regulatory framework for non-powernuclear facilities in Korea.