North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Further Approaches for the WMD and Missile Non-proliferation
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North Korea's military acts with a pattern of a long-range missile/rocket test launch fulfilled before a nuclear test were worsened the problem and security environment in a region, which shows Pyongyang's unwillingness to give up the nuclear and missile development and proliferation. Such a provocative attitude included political purposes, which presents the Clusewitzian sense with Pyongyang's creating crisis and "menace-for-compensation strategy" as well as "brinkmanship strategy," bearing in mind of a 'zero-sum game' and a 'chicken game' in opposition to Washington, in a process of obtaining the nuclear armed missile. Meanwhile, other pending military issues such as missile and bio-chemical weapons problem in a six-party talks framework were disregarded. Their issues should be dealt with for the purpose of not simply the WMD and missile non-proliferation but easing tension phase and being more stable security environment in the Korean Peninsula. The best way for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement on North Korean nuclear and ballistic missiles is to adhere to the mutual agreements consented to at the six-nation talks in pursuit of corresponding steps, simultaneous response, and step-by-step approach based on the Joint Statement with a principle of "commitment for commitment" and "action for action." For chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation, the North has to enter into “Chemical Weapons Convention,” and both the US and the DPRK simultaneously should agree and keep punishment for violation in a framework of “Biological Toxin Weapons Convention.”
Abstract
North Korea's military acts with a pattern of a long-range missile/rocket test launch fulfilled before a nuclear test were worsened the problem and security environment in a region, which shows Pyongyang's unwillingness to give up the nuclear and missile development and proliferation. Such a provocative attitude included political purposes, which presents the Clusewitzian sense with Pyongyang's creating crisis and "menace-for-compensation strategy" as well as "brinkmanship strategy," bearing in mind of a 'zero-sum game' and a 'chicken game' in opposition to Washington, in a process of obtaining the nuclear armed missile. Meanwhile, other pending military issues such as missile and bio-chemical weapons problem in a six-party talks framework were disregarded. Their issues should be dealt with for the purpose of not simply the WMD and missile non-proliferation but easing tension phase and being more stable security environment in the Korean Peninsula. The best way for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement on North Korean nuclear and ballistic missiles is to adhere to the mutual agreements consented to at the six-nation talks in pursuit of corresponding steps, simultaneous response, and step-by-step approach based on the Joint Statement with a principle of "commitment for commitment" and "action for action." For chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation, the North has to enter into “Chemical Weapons Convention,” and both the US and the DPRK simultaneously should agree and keep punishment for violation in a framework of “Biological Toxin Weapons Convention.”
참고문헌 (23)
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