A Moderate, A-metaphysical, and Hierarchical Proposal to Save Liberal Orders—Response to Critics
0
조회
0
다운로드
1
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
In this article, I respond to four critics of my book, Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case. Although sharing my concerns with democracy, Yarren Hominh argues that I fail to appreciate the role of capitalism in corrupting democracy. The cure I propose, then, is doomed to fail, and the real hope lies in the power to the working people. After clarifying our differences, I argue that the meritocratic design in my proposal can be considered to be a compromise before all people are lifted up, if they can ever be lifted up. Both Steven Wall and Thomas Mulligan criticize me from the “right,” pressuring me to adopt the position of natural aristocracy instead of merely defending meritocracy on a consequentialist ground. But considering myself to be a Wittgensteinian, my worry with concepts such as natural aristocracy and desert is that they will lead us back to a metaphysical and potentially oppressive path. Daniel Corrigan questions me on how I determine the content of rights, especially in light of how Rawls did it. On the one hand, I argue that the way Rawls “determines” the content of rights is metaphysical and even arbitrary, which is why I leave this issue aside completely. On the other hand, I argue that we should have more rights than liberal neutrality allows in order to preserve liberalism.
Abstract
In this article, I respond to four critics of my book, Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case. Although sharing my concerns with democracy, Yarren Hominh argues that I fail to appreciate the role of capitalism in corrupting democracy. The cure I propose, then, is doomed to fail, and the real hope lies in the power to the working people. After clarifying our differences, I argue that the meritocratic design in my proposal can be considered to be a compromise before all people are lifted up, if they can ever be lifted up. Both Steven Wall and Thomas Mulligan criticize me from the “right,” pressuring me to adopt the position of natural aristocracy instead of merely defending meritocracy on a consequentialist ground. But considering myself to be a Wittgensteinian, my worry with concepts such as natural aristocracy and desert is that they will lead us back to a metaphysical and potentially oppressive path. Daniel Corrigan questions me on how I determine the content of rights, especially in light of how Rawls did it. On the one hand, I argue that the way Rawls “determines” the content of rights is metaphysical and even arbitrary, which is why I leave this issue aside completely. On the other hand, I argue that we should have more rights than liberal neutrality allows in order to preserve liberalism.
참고문헌 (4)
- Bai, Tongdong, "The Philosophical Challenge from China", pp.101~120 (2015), MIT Press
- Bai, Tongdong, "Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case" (2021), Princeton University Press
- Rawls, John, "The Law of Peoples with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”" (1999), Harvard University Press
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, "On Certainty" (1969), Harper and Row
