腐敗 可能性과 組織設計
Corruption and Organizational Design
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초록
본 논문은 조직 내 부패 (corruption) 유형으로서 담합(collusion) 뿐 아니라 협박 ·갈취(extortion) 도 명시적으로 포함하여 이것이 계약의 형태와 조직설계 (기획·집행 기능의 통합여부 )에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석한다 . 통합조직 하에서는 부패문제는 없으나, 사적 정보를 수집한 대리인이 직접 집행업무를 담당하면서 비용을 과장하려는 인센티브 문제가 발생하게 된다 . 반면 분리조직 하에서는 이러한 인센티브 문제 대신에 대리인간 담합이나 갈취와 같은 부패 문제가 발생할 수 있다. 주인은 갈취를 방지하기 위해 상황에 따라 기획담당 대리인을 충분히 보상해 주는 계약을 택하거나 , 집행 담당 대리인에게 렌트를 부여하는 계약을 택하는 것으로 나타난다. 아울러 본 논문에서는 통합조직과 분리조직 사이의 선택과 관련된 조건들도 함께 분석한다 .
Abstract
This paper studies how the possibilities of corruptions such as collusion and extortion affect the choice of organizational mode. The principal may integrate or separate the tasks of planning and implementation of a project. Corruption becomes an issue only when the principal chooses to separate the tasks. When the tasks are separated, the planning agent, who obtains private information, may collude with or extort the implementation agent. We show that there are two ways in which the principal deters extortion. One is to over-compensate the truth-telling planning agent. The other is to provide the implementation agent, who does not have any private information, with rent. We also identify the conditions under which the principal chooses to separate the tasks.
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