Counterterrorism with Cross-Border Spillover
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This paper examines two types of cross-border spillover effects in counterterrorism. “Technological spillover” occurs when increased terror activities in a country facilitate knowledge transfer from domestic to foreign terrorists. “Displacement effect,” on the other hand, occurs when decreased domestic terror activities induce an increase in terror activities in a foreign country. When countries are symmetric, each country invests too little or too much in counterterrorism depending on which of the two effects dominates. When countries are asymmetric, however, such a conclusion does not hold. In particular, it is shown that a “net exporter” of terrorism will invest too much in counterterrorism if the asymmetry is sufficiently large.
Abstract
This paper examines two types of cross-border spillover effects in counterterrorism. “Technological spillover” occurs when increased terror activities in a country facilitate knowledge transfer from domestic to foreign terrorists. “Displacement effect,” on the other hand, occurs when decreased domestic terror activities induce an increase in terror activities in a foreign country. When countries are symmetric, each country invests too little or too much in counterterrorism depending on which of the two effects dominates. When countries are asymmetric, however, such a conclusion does not hold. In particular, it is shown that a “net exporter” of terrorism will invest too much in counterterrorism if the asymmetry is sufficiently large.
참고문헌 (15)
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