우계 성혼의 퇴율절충론의 철학적 함의 -리기일발설(理氣一發說)의 존재론적 해석

Abstract

In this article, I will elucidate the philosophical implication of Seong Hon (成渾, 1535~1598, 牛溪)'s compromising thought between Toegye (退溪) Yi Hwang (李滉) and Yulgok (栗谷) Yi I (李珥) focusing on the interpretation of his theory of "the unified manifestation of li and chi" (理氣一發). Concerning the Four-seven debate, Seong Hon did not align himself with Ki Daeseung (奇大升) nor agreeing with Yi Hwang from the beginning. Although he felt Ki's logic was more clear than Yi's, Seong thought that Yi's "mutual manifestation theory" (互發說) had the reasonable basis if considering Zhu Xi (朱熹)'s theory of Human Mind and Moral Mind. However, Seong's advocating Yi Hwang as such was superficial since he actually did not agree on the "mutual manifestation theory". Seong thought that it is possible only in the nominal dimension to separate Four Beginnings (Moral Mind) and Seven Emotions (Human Mind) in terms of li and chi. In reality, Four Beginnings belong to Seven Emotions as the general functions of mind where both are not able to be distinguished. Seong established his position with the theory of "the unified manifestation of li and chi" which implied that the distinction between the two perspectives of juli (主理, regarding mainly as moral principle) and juki (主氣, regarding mainly as temperament) on the functions of mind as the unified substance is possible only in the nominal dimension. In Seong’s thought, moral good and evil could be discriminated by practical deliberation which did not appertain to cognition. He seems to think that such a deliberation is able to be acquired by practical self-cultivation. Seong Hon's compromising thought, characteristics of which are ontological rather than epistemological, can be regarded as the third position different from the two epistemological standpoints in the mainstream of Korean Neo-Confucianism.