퇴계 리발(理發) 설에 대한 몇 가지 오해

Abstract

In this paper, the author tries to correct some critical misunderstandings that contemporary Neo­confucian scholars frequently commit when they interpret T’oegye’s moral­psychological proposition of li­fa. Those misunderstandings include at least three different arguments as shown below. Firstly, T’oegye conceived that li can be realized or manifested by itself without the vehicle of qi which is the ontological base of li. Secondly, T’oegye conceived that li not only precedes qi, but also moves prior to qi. Thirdly, T’oegye’s proposition of “issuance of li”(li­fa) is nothing but a paradoxical expression that deviates from the ontological grammar of Zhu Xi. Contemporary scholars, based on these misguided interpretation, assert that “T’oegye’s conception of li is active.” In this paper, the author tried to refute these misinterpretations by presenting obvious counter evidences shown in T’ogye’s own writings and documents.