FRAND 조건 표준필수특허 라이선스 확약과 시장지배력 남용 문제 - 대법원 2023. 4. 13. 선고 2020두31897 판결을 중심으로 -
FRAND Condition Emcumbered Standard Essential Patents and Abuse of Dominance: A Critical View on the South Korean Supreme Court’s Decision on Qualcomm II Case of April 2023
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초록
대법원은 공정거래위원회(이하 ‘공정위’)가 퀄컴의 스마트폰 모뎀 칩셋 및 관련 FRAND 조건 확약 표준필수특허(SEP) 영업모델과 관련하여 칩셋제조사에 대하여 이사건 SEP 라이선스 계약 체결을 거절하고 그 대신 부제소약정을 체결한 행위, 휴대폰 제조사에 대하여 라이선스 계약과 칩셋공급 계약을 분리한 행위 등 일부 행위(이른바 ‘행위 1, 2’)가 경쟁자 비용상승 등을 초래하였다는 이유로 시장지배력 남용에 해당하고, 휴대폰제조업자와 포괄 라이선스, 교차 라이선스 체결한 행위 등(이른바 ‘행위 3’)은 시장지배력 남용에 해당하지 않는다고 한 원심을 수긍하였다(대법원 2023. 4. 13. 선고 2020두31897 판결). 그런데 공정위는 행위 1, 2, 3으로 인한 구체적인 경쟁제한 효과가 실제로 초래되었다거나 객관적으로 초래될 개연성을 증명하지 못하였으므로, 경쟁제한의도도 추정되지 않는다. 그럼에도 불구하고 원심은 공정위의 가설적 이론을 수용하여 행위 1, 2의 경쟁제한 우려와 의도가 인정된다고 하였다. 대상판결은 행위 1, 2과 관련하여 포스코 법리를 형식적으로 원용하였을 뿐 실제로는 포스코 법리에서 이탈하였다.
Abstract
Both Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and competition law are critical to enhance economic efficiency and consumer welfare. However, there have been divergent views as to what kind of licensing practice concerning ‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ (FRAND) condition encumbered SEPs exactly constitutes a violation of the competition law. In the Qualcomm Ⅱ case, it does not seem that Qualcomm used its SEPs as holdup. Rather, it seems that Qualcomm’s competitors used the South Korean antitrust law as holdout. According to the POSCO jurisprudence, anticompetitive effects must be proved for condemming the conducts in question as abuse of dominance. The Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) just applied its own dubious theories without evidence showing anticompetitive effects. As the KFTC failed to prove that Qualcomm’s conducts in question caused anticompetitive effects, those conducts could not be abuse of domiance. However, the Qualcomm Ⅱ Court wrongfully confirmed that Qualcomm had abused its market power. The Qualcomm Ⅱ decision is hardly confirmed with the POSCO jurisprudence.
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