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맥아더 해임과 문민우위 원칙을 둘러싼 논란에 대한 비판적 고찰

A Critical Study on the Controversy over theDismiss of General MacArthur and the Principle ofCivilian Control over the Military

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국방부군사편찬연구소 (Military History Institute, MND)|2009.06|군사 (military history)|제71호|pp. 81-110|DOI 10.29212/mh.2009..71.81

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키워드

한국전쟁스탈린Stalin냉전Cold Warthe Korean War봉쇄전략맥아더MacArthur클라우제비츠트루먼TrumanLimited War제한전문민우위중국개입Civilian Control over the MilitaryCarl von ClausewitzChinese Communist Forces(CCF) InterventionContainment Strategy
주제분류역사학

초록

President Truman's decision to relieve General MacArthur from the Commanders of the United Nations and the Far East Command caused consternation because it was made in the middle of the Korean War after Chinese intervention. His dismiss is a topic still arousing controversy. With the opening of Soviet and Chinese archives at the end of the Cold War a variety of subjects relating to the Korean War are being reexamined. The controversy on the relief of MacArthur is one of the most important subjects to be reassessed. The article begins by examining Clausewitz's theory of war which provides the theoretical foundation on the principle of civilian control over the military. The principle was cited as one of the main reason for the relief of MacArthur. The article argues that American intervention was made to achieve the political objective of preventing the communists from expanding over the US containment line. With the brilliant victory at Inchon the original US objectives began to expand. It resulted in the rising tension between civilian leaders in Washington and MacArthur. The article will explain the limits of MacArthur's argument on the expansion of the battlefield into Manchuria during the period from Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) intervention and his relief. It will analyze how civilian leaders pursued the original purpose of limited war in opposition to MacArthur. The article will conclude by arguing that the containment is more pertinent than MacArthur's rollback strategy in peacefully managing and ending the Cold War. In the controversy over MacArthur's dismiss civilian leaders are also responsible for the debacle after CCF intervention.

Abstract

President Truman's decision to relieve General MacArthur from the Commanders of the United Nations and the Far East Command caused consternation because it was made in the middle of the Korean War after Chinese intervention. His dismiss is a topic still arousing controversy. With the opening of Soviet and Chinese archives at the end of the Cold War a variety of subjects relating to the Korean War are being reexamined. The controversy on the relief of MacArthur is one of the most important subjects to be reassessed. The article begins by examining Clausewitz's theory of war which provides the theoretical foundation on the principle of civilian control over the military. The principle was cited as one of the main reason for the relief of MacArthur. The article argues that American intervention was made to achieve the political objective of preventing the communists from expanding over the US containment line. With the brilliant victory at Inchon the original US objectives began to expand. It resulted in the rising tension between civilian leaders in Washington and MacArthur. The article will explain the limits of MacArthur's argument on the expansion of the battlefield into Manchuria during the period from Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) intervention and his relief. It will analyze how civilian leaders pursued the original purpose of limited war in opposition to MacArthur. The article will conclude by arguing that the containment is more pertinent than MacArthur's rollback strategy in peacefully managing and ending the Cold War. In the controversy over MacArthur's dismiss civilian leaders are also responsible for the debacle after CCF intervention.

참고문헌 (44)

  1. Carl von Clausewitz, "On War", pp.75~ (1989), Princeton University Press
  2. Michael Walzer, "Just and Unjust Wars", pp.122~ (1977), Basic Books
  3. John W. Spanier, "The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War", pp.13~ (1965), Norton
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  7. "“Joint Outline Emergency War Plan", JCS 1844", 46, November 8. 1949, box 81, CCS 381 USSR(3-2-46) sec. 41, Record Group 218, National Archives, 1949
  8. "Memorandum by Jessup, June 26, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 179를 참조", ~ (1950)
  9. "JCS to MacArthur, June 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 241", ~ (1950)
  10. "Draft Memorandum by the PPS", FRUS, 7, pp.452~ (1950)
  11. "Draft Memorandum of the Department of Defense", FRUS, 7, pp.506~ (1950)
  12. "NSC 81", 1, “US Courses of Action with Respect to Korea", September 9, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 712, 1950
  13. "Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference", FRUS, 7, pp.953~ (1950)
  14. Mattew B. Ridgway, "The Korean War", pp.42~ (1967), Doubleday
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  17. "Acheson to the US Mission at the UN", FRUS, 7, pp.1047~ (1950)
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  21. Acheson, "Present at the Creation", pp.446~
  22. Jonathan Pollack, "The Korean War and Sino-American Relations in: Sino- American Relations, 1945-1950", pp.224~ (1989), Scholarly Resources
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  26. Kim Il Sung, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950", pp.116~117 (1950), Woodrow Wilson Center
  27. "Clubb to Rusk", FRUS, 7, pp.1091~1092 (1950)
  28. "“JCS Report", RG 59", ~
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  30. "Minutes of the First Meeting of Truman and Attlee", FRUS, 7, pp.1369~1371 (1950)
  31. "JCS to MacArthur", FRUS, 7, pp.1625~ (1950)
  32. Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims During the Korean War", pp.28~29
  33. "MacArthur to JCS", FRUS, 7, pp.1632~ (1950)
  34. "Daily Intelligence Summary, No. 3092, FEC, RG 338", ~
  35. "MacArthur to JCS", FRUS, 7, pp.56~ (1951)
  36. "Memorandum of Conversation by Jessup", FRUS, 7, pp.68~ (1951)
  37. "MacArthur to Martin", FRUS, 7, pp.299~ (1951)
  38. "Memorandum for the Record of a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting", FRUS, 7, pp.175~ (1951)
  39. "Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 455", ~
  40. "Clausewitz, On War, p. 89", ~
  41. "Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 42", ~
  42. "Resolution 376(V), October 7, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 904- 906", ~ (1950)
  43. Acheson, "Present at the Creation, p. 455", ~
  44. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950", pp.116~ (1950)

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