6ㆍ25전쟁시 전차운용의 특징과 영향
The Characteristics and result of Tank Employment in Korean War
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During the Korean War (1950∼1953), the tank was a decisive weapon system which dominated the battlefield. TheT-34 tank conducted decisive role as to drive the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) Forces into the Line of defense, Nakdong River.On the other hand, during the counter-attack, the US Forces' tank troops seized the initiative. And then the situation was changed when the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) engaged. In that time, there were approximately 2,000 tanks of diverse model of 7 countries, the North Korean People Army (NKPA), US, United Kingdom, CCF, Canada, Philippine and ROK. Especially, the CCF operated approximately 400 tanks with 2 tank divisions. And it's interesting because we normally regarded that they had used so called 'human-wave tactics'. The ROK Armed Forces operated approximately 220 tanks with 3 tank battalions in1953. Making and addition, the ROK Armed Forces didn't have any tank in 1950. Butthe NKPA had more than 150 tanks with 1 tank Brigade and 1 tank regiment. They attached the tank troops to the infantry division in order to operate tank troops by the axis. The NKPA obtained great success by dispersing. But Basil Liddell Hart said "If the NKPA operated its tank troops in concentrating form like Heinz Guderian did in 1940. they could had dominated the Korean Peninsula before the ROK and US Forces secured the Line of Defense, Nakdong River. And then, as the US Forces begun the counter-attack operation, their tank troops could dominate the battlefield. They also operated tank troops in dispersing form. But it is worthy of notice that they came up with various operating model of the counter-attack, link-up operation, covering operation, withdrawal, reconnaissance in force, surprise attack which had been useful in the terrain of Korean Peninsula. Especially, the way of task organizing the infantry, tank and artillery units is the original form of the modern armed forces operation. In the Korean war, the tank took a role of a main actor. Some students of military artsay that in the terrain of Korean Peninsula, tank is not appropriate one. But it's not true. The analysis on the Korean War shows the tank conducted main role as to overcome terrain and swayed the direction of war finally. That's the reason why many countries started to develop and improve a new type tank after the Korean War. The NKPA and ROK tried to promote the tank troops also. It has a influence both physical and psychological power. From old time, the battlefield condition had been changing. Weshould prepare new operating conception forthe future operational environment. We should consider our battle reality like a limited battle space, high density of deployment, powerful obstacles. And we pursuit change and challenge. The Korean War is at reasure house of the military doctrine. There are new trends of the Korean War study because confidential material of the USSR and CCF has been opening to the public. But the study on the role of tank is still insufficient. I hope this study could be helpful to make clear the historical fact. The tank was the key factor to understand the Korean War.
Abstract
During the Korean War (1950∼1953), the tank was a decisive weapon system which dominated the battlefield. TheT-34 tank conducted decisive role as to drive the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (US) Forces into the Line of defense, Nakdong River.On the other hand, during the counter-attack, the US Forces' tank troops seized the initiative. And then the situation was changed when the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) engaged. In that time, there were approximately 2,000 tanks of diverse model of 7 countries, the North Korean People Army (NKPA), US, United Kingdom, CCF, Canada, Philippine and ROK. Especially, the CCF operated approximately 400 tanks with 2 tank divisions. And it's interesting because we normally regarded that they had used so called 'human-wave tactics'. The ROK Armed Forces operated approximately 220 tanks with 3 tank battalions in1953. Making and addition, the ROK Armed Forces didn't have any tank in 1950. Butthe NKPA had more than 150 tanks with 1 tank Brigade and 1 tank regiment. They attached the tank troops to the infantry division in order to operate tank troops by the axis. The NKPA obtained great success by dispersing. But Basil Liddell Hart said "If the NKPA operated its tank troops in concentrating form like Heinz Guderian did in 1940. they could had dominated the Korean Peninsula before the ROK and US Forces secured the Line of Defense, Nakdong River. And then, as the US Forces begun the counter-attack operation, their tank troops could dominate the battlefield. They also operated tank troops in dispersing form. But it is worthy of notice that they came up with various operating model of the counter-attack, link-up operation, covering operation, withdrawal, reconnaissance in force, surprise attack which had been useful in the terrain of Korean Peninsula. Especially, the way of task organizing the infantry, tank and artillery units is the original form of the modern armed forces operation. In the Korean war, the tank took a role of a main actor. Some students of military artsay that in the terrain of Korean Peninsula, tank is not appropriate one. But it's not true. The analysis on the Korean War shows the tank conducted main role as to overcome terrain and swayed the direction of war finally. That's the reason why many countries started to develop and improve a new type tank after the Korean War. The NKPA and ROK tried to promote the tank troops also. It has a influence both physical and psychological power. From old time, the battlefield condition had been changing. Weshould prepare new operating conception forthe future operational environment. We should consider our battle reality like a limited battle space, high density of deployment, powerful obstacles. And we pursuit change and challenge. The Korean War is at reasure house of the military doctrine. There are new trends of the Korean War study because confidential material of the USSR and CCF has been opening to the public. But the study on the role of tank is still insufficient. I hope this study could be helpful to make clear the historical fact. The tank was the key factor to understand the Korean War.
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