북한정권 성립 이후 ‘통일’전략 논의와 전쟁 준비 - 1948년 9월부터 1950년 1월까지를 중심으로 -

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore how unification strategies were discussed among chief leaders in North Korea and how preparations for war were made along lines of these discussions during the period between the establishment of the North Korean regime and the outbreak of the Korean War. So far, the main academic debates about the war have been mainly on the origins and causes of the War. Based on the Soviet archive materials partially opened in the 1990s and “the captured North Korean Documents” which had not received much attention, many researchers have focused on the relations between North Korea and the Soviet Union surrounding the war and have made a long debate about who was the leader in determining the War. By contrast, researches on the unification strategy discussions and the mobilization for the War made within North Korea have not been conducted enough. For example, how the North raised the war fund and prepared war resources and materials before the starting of the war has never been studied. Furthermore, the relations between the unification strategy discussion and the actual ideological and material mobilization have not been identified. This paper is an attempt to fill the gap in historical knowledge on these subjects, based on a variety of historical source and personal testimonies. First of all, it should be noted that North Korea’s strategy discussion for unification was made almost simultaneously with the establishment of the regime. The leadership of the Government declared the “complete reconstruction of the country” and “national unification” as their policy priority among the new government’s political principles, right after establishing their government in September1948. In addition, the Labor Party determined the reunification of North and South Koreas and the extension of North Korea’s system to the whole country (both Koreas)to be their top priority. However, opinions of the concrete methods of unification were divided between the leading groups. The Manchurian Partisan faction including Kim Il Sung, Choi Yong-Gun, and Kang Gun insisted the unification through the Army's invasion of the South should be put first and that the South Labor Party’s partisan activities should assist this, while the South Labor Party faction including Park Hun Young claimed the South Korean partisans should over throw the ROK mainly through the people’s uprisings and that North Korea just aid this. During his official visit to Moscow in March 1949, Kim Il Sung suggested the unification by armed force to Stalin, but Stalin refused flatly to approve this by pointing out the unfavorable international situation and the agreement with the United States on keepingthe38th latitude division. He mentioned that if the South attacked first, the North’s counterattack could be allowed but the North should not make a preemptive attack on the South. After this, Kim IL Sung several times urged Stalin to approve his proposal of the unification by armed force but could not get the consent before the end of January 1950. Under these circumstances, Kim Il Sung was establishing the system of mobilization secretly having a war in mind, while supporting the South Labor Party’s partisan activities. Throughout the year 1949, the North leadership was making efforts very secretly to strengthen the mobilization system of the people and also putting time and energy on raising the fund to increase armaments and reserve war materials. The North Korean leadership presumed that the people of North Korea would have aversion on them if the North Korea invaded the South Korea first. Therefore, they were to deceive the people by propagandizing that young people should enlist in the military or be trained in the workplace to prevent the United States and South Korea from invading the North. Also, under the name of ‘the national physical fitness test,’ each department at all levels of the government was in charge of identifying the population to be mobilized to a war and making the military registration card. The Labor party, the Defensive Committee for Fatherland, and all the social organizations such as Democratic Youth’s Union, Women’s Union, and Farmers’ Union gave it their best shot through various meetings and brochures to incite the people to respond to this national policy. Furthermore, the North Korean leadership deceived the people to secretly accumulate funds for the war. In order to raise capital to purchase weapons of war from the Soviet Union, they sold government bonds to residents by making an excuse that the money was necessary for “loans for national economic development.” Also, in order to conceal their armament expansion and war fundraising, they announced only a portion of the actual defense budget as “Defense Fund for the Fatherland (National Defense Budget)”and hid the remaining funds into the other budget items. In 1949, the “Defense Fund for the Fatherland” was announced to be3.1 Billion won, 15% of the total expenditure 19.7 billion 26 million won, but the actual military spending amounted to 7.1 billion won. Besides, the money collected from the people in the name of' donation fund for military equipments, 'the loans of about 850 million won by barter from the Soviet Union, and 2.5 billion won collected for economic development in the name of national bonds were added to this military budget. Therefore, North Korea’s actual military expenditure in 1949 amounted to 10 billion 384 million 600 thousand won. At the same time, through various means, North Korea prepared enough War materials for People’s Army to carry out a war for two months with no difficulty. These were partly from the loans and partly from the people’s contributions in the name of' voluntary fund for military equipment. 'Thus, North Korea was able to stockpile supplies needed to sustain a short term War for duration of 2 months, such as food, fuel, ammunition, clothing, etc. However, it ran short of provisions for a longer term war.