Policy Liberalism and Political Institutions
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This paper examines the impacts of political institutions, especially a president’s party affiliation and job performance, on the generosity of social welfare benefits, which are one of the characteristics of policy liberalism, through an investigation of U.S. social welfare expenditures. Findings indicate that a president’s party affiliation is a key predictor of his policy preferences, agendas, and policy liberalism or conservatism despite institutional and political constraints, whereas a president’s job performance, measured by either success on congressional votes or job approval, is not linked to the generosity of social welfare benefits. In an age of global capitalism undergoing radical changes in the political and economic environment, however, a president’s party affiliation is not a crucial indicator of policy preferences or policy liberalism/conservatism. Additionally, political leaders’ policy preferences and tools appear to determine more significantly the destiny of welfare programs than a president’s job performance or economic conditions like unemployment.
Abstract
This paper examines the impacts of political institutions, especially a president’s party affiliation and job performance, on the generosity of social welfare benefits, which are one of the characteristics of policy liberalism, through an investigation of U.S. social welfare expenditures. Findings indicate that a president’s party affiliation is a key predictor of his policy preferences, agendas, and policy liberalism or conservatism despite institutional and political constraints, whereas a president’s job performance, measured by either success on congressional votes or job approval, is not linked to the generosity of social welfare benefits. In an age of global capitalism undergoing radical changes in the political and economic environment, however, a president’s party affiliation is not a crucial indicator of policy preferences or policy liberalism/conservatism. Additionally, political leaders’ policy preferences and tools appear to determine more significantly the destiny of welfare programs than a president’s job performance or economic conditions like unemployment.
참고문헌 (29)
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