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The Influence of Contextual Factors on Collective Actions for Locating Facilities with Externalities: Applying the Institutional Collective Action Framework

박종선|하현상
서울대학교행정대학원 (gspa(graduate school of public administration seoul national university))|2012.04|Journal of Policy Studies|제27권 제1호|pp. 57-85|DOI http://dx.doi.org/

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키워드

conflictcompetitionexternalityinstitutional collective action
주제분류정책학

초록

This study applies the Institutional Collective Action Framework to two cases: proposals for the construction of Taekwondo Park and the location of a nuclear waste dump site in Booahn. While the proposed park caused excessive competition because its benefits were overestimated and its private goods were considered necessary, the proposed nuclear waste site resulted in excessive conflict because of uncertainty about its potential harms and because its public goods were considered unnecessary. The former case showed homogeneity of political power and cooperation based on trust, whereas the latter case showed heterogeneity of political power and conflict based on distrust. Both cases showed politicians’ active participation based on their reelection goals and a blocked network structure between central and local governments. Stakeholders in both cases showed strong internal ties with other stakeholders with similar potential political and economic benefits.

Abstract

This study applies the Institutional Collective Action Framework to two cases: proposals for the construction of Taekwondo Park and the location of a nuclear waste dump site in Booahn. While the proposed park caused excessive competition because its benefits were overestimated and its private goods were considered necessary, the proposed nuclear waste site resulted in excessive conflict because of uncertainty about its potential harms and because its public goods were considered unnecessary. The former case showed homogeneity of political power and cooperation based on trust, whereas the latter case showed heterogeneity of political power and conflict based on distrust. Both cases showed politicians’ active participation based on their reelection goals and a blocked network structure between central and local governments. Stakeholders in both cases showed strong internal ties with other stakeholders with similar potential political and economic benefits.

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