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한국은행의 목적조항에 고용안정을 추가하는 것이 바람직할까?

Would it be desirable to include an employment objective clause in the Bank of Korea Act?

신관호
한국경제의 분석패널 (Panel for Korean Economic Analysis)|2022.08|한국경제의 분석 (Journal of Korean Economic Analysis)|제28권 제2호|pp. 51-97|DOI 10.22823/jkea.28.2.202208.51

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고용물가인플레이션 타겟팅Inflation Targeting한국은행Bank of Korea목적조항실물안정Monetary Policy GoalsReal Stability
주제분류경제학

초록

본 논문은 한국은행의 목적조항에 고용에 관한 내용이 포함되는 것이 바람직한지에 대해 분석한다. 물가안정보다 고용촉진은 경제주체들의 후생에 보다 직접적인 영향을 미친다. 정부의 정책목표가 국민의 후생을 높이는 것이라 할 때, 넓게 봐서 정부의 일부라고 볼 수 있는 한국은행이 통화정책을 집행하는 과정에서 국민의 후생을 직접적으로 증진시킬 수 있다면 이를 목표로 포함하는 것은 바람직하다고 하겠다. 하지만 고용을 중앙은행의 직접적인 목표로 명시하는 데에는 크게 세 가지 측면에서 반대의견이 제기된다. 첫째, 통화정책은 고용과 같은 실물변수에 지속적으로 영향을 주기 어렵다. 둘째, 고용을 증진시키려는 단기성과에 집착하는 과정에서 장기적으로 물가상승률을 높이는 우를 범하기 쉽다. 셋째, 한국의 경우 노동시장이 경직적이어서 경기상황을 제대로 반영하지 못하므로 정책의 운영과정에서 투명성, 커뮤니케이션, 책임성 등이 떨어질 수 있다. 대부분의 국가는 물가안정만을 명시적인 목표로 내세우는 인플레이션 타겟팅을 채택하고 있다. 하지만 이들 국가들은 유연한 인플레이션 타겟팅을 채택하여 물가상승률 목표는 중기적으로 달성하고 단기적으로는 실물경기 혹은 고용안정을 달성하기 위해 통화정책을 활용하고 있다. 한국의 경우에도 실물경기와 물가안정 사이에 상충적인 상황에서 오히려 물가보다는 실물경기에 반응하여 통화정책을 집행한 경우가 대부분이었다. 결론적으로 고용에 관한 목적조항을 명시적으로 포함하지 않아도 한국은행이 실물경기안정을 추구할 수 있는 여지는 상당하며, 이 상황에서 고용안정을 추가적으로 명시하는 것은 장기적인 물가안정을 저해하여 오히려 바람직하지 않은 결과를 초래할 수 있으므로 부적절하다고 하겠다.

Abstract

This study analyzes whether it is desirable to include an employment objective clause in the Bank of Korea (BOK) act. Employment promotion, compared to price stability, has a more direct effect on the welfare of the economy. Given that the government's policy goal is to improve the welfare of the economy, it is desirable that the Bank of Korea, which can be viewed as a part of the government in a broader sense, directly improve the welfare in conducting monetary policy. However, there are three major objections to specifying employment as the central bank's direct goal. First, it is difficult for monetary policy to persistently influence real variables such as employment. Second, in pursuing short-term objective to promote employment, the BOK is likely to raise the inflation rate in the long run. Third, in the case of Korea, transparency, communication, and accountability in the policy operation may be severely impaired since the labor market is rigid and does not properly reflect the economic condition. Most countries adopt inflation targeting with only price stability as an explicit goal. However, these countries actually adopt flexible inflation targeting which allows monetary policy to achieve the inflation target in the medium term and accomplish real economy or employment stability in the short term. In the case of Bank of Korea, in a conflicting situation between the real economy and price stability, monetary authorities used to stabilize the real economy rather than inflation. In conclusion, there is considerable room for the Bank of Korea to pursue stability of the real economy and hence it is inappropriate to include an employment objective clause in the BOK act, as it could harm long-term price stability and lead to undesirable consequences.

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