본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

한국은행의 역할과 정책수단: 금융안정정책을 중심으로

Financial Stability, Macroprudential Policy Tools, and the Role of the Bank of Korea

김소영|김진일|김성현|신관호|김인준
한국경제의 분석패널 (Panel for Korean Economic Analysis)|2017.04|한국경제의 분석 (Journal of Korean Economic Analysis)|제23권 제1호|pp. 185-287|DOI 10.22823/jkea.23.1.201704.185

0

조회

0

다운로드

9

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

거시건전성정책macroprudential policy금융안정inflation targeting한국은행financial stabilityBank of Korea물가상승률 목표제
주제분류경제학

초록

글로벌 금융위기 이후 전 세계적으로 나타나고 있는 저성장, 저물가, 금융불안의 시대를 맞아 기존의 물가안정이나 고용안정 외에 금융안정화가 중앙은행의 중요 목표로 인식되고 있다. 본 연구는 금융안정화를 위해 한국은행이 맡아야 하는 바람직한 역할이 무엇이며 중장기적으로 한국은행이 금융안정화를 위한 거시건전성 정책을 펼치는데 있어 어떠한 변화가 필요한지에 대해 분석하였다. 본 연구는 한국은행이 신축적 물가상승률 목표제를 그대로 유지하면서 단기적으로 실물경기안정을 동시에 추구하기를 권고한다. 동시에 동운영체제만으로 한국은행의 새로운 목표인 금융안정을 달성하기는 현실적으로 어렵다고 판단한다. 이번 글로벌 금융위기를 통해 얻은 교훈 중 하나는 전통적으로 가장 중요하게 여겨졌던 두 부문의 안정화, 즉 실물경기의 안정화와 물가의 안정화가 동시에 달성되더라도 금융부문의 불안정성이 커질 수 있고, 결국 금융불안이 증폭되면 일시에 실물과 물가도 불안정해질 수 있다는 사실이다. 따라서 금융불안이 너무 커지기 전에 사전적으로 이에 대응할 필요가 있다. 하지만 통화정책만으로 물가 및 실물 안정을 추구하면서 금융안정까지 추구하는 것에는 상당한 어려움이 따른다. 틴버겐의 법칙에 따르면 여러 목표를 달성하기 위해선 동일한 수의 수단이 필요하다. 경제전체의 금융불안에 사전적으로 대응할 수 있는 수단을 거시건전성 정책수단이라고 한다. 글로벌 금융위기 이후 2011년 새롭게 개정된 한은법에는 금융안정이 한국은행의 새로운 목표로 명시되었지만 이에 대응할 수 있는 수단의 확충에는 소홀히 하였다. 따라서 한국은행이 물가상승률 목표제와 금융안정을 동시에 달성하기 위해선 거시건전성 정책 수단의 확충이 필수적이다. 이를 위해 가장 손쉽게 시도해 볼 수 있는 방안은 금융위원회의 설치 등에 관한 법률을 개정하여 한국은행이 거시건전성 정책 운영에 참여하도록 하는 것이다. 즉 “금융위원회는 중요한 거시건전성정책을 결정할 때 이를 한국은행과 반드시 협의한 후 금융위원회에 부의해야 한다”라고 명시하는 것이다. 동시에 거시건전성정책에 대한 한국은행의 책임도 명시화할 필요가 있다. 보다 장기적인 관점에서 근본적으로 거시건전성 정책체계를 바꿀 수 있다는 가정을 염두에 두고 새로운 시스템을 설계하자면 다음의 세 가지 방안을 생각해 볼 수 있다. [방안 1]은 시스템 위기를 전담하는 금융안정위원회(가칭)를 상설기구로 신설하고 동 위원회에서 거시건전성 정책을 의결하도록 하는 것이다. [방안 2]는 거시건전성 정책의 주체로 한국은행을 지정하는 것이다. [방안 3]은 금융감독체계를 전면 개편하여, 한국은행으로 하여금 거시건전성 정책을 포함한 금융 건전성감독 전반을 책임지게 하는 것이다. 영국은 금융위기 이후 법체계를 정비하여 이러한 방안을 채택하였다. 하지만 [방안 3]은 한국이 채택하기 위해서는 전면적인 금융감독체계의 개편을 필요로 한다는 점에서 현실적으로 한계가 있다.

Abstract

Under the current economic environment characterized by slow growth, low inflation and financial instability, ojectives of central bank have expanded to include financial stability in addition to the traditional objectives of price and employment stability. This paper studies what the proper role of the Bank of Korea (BOK) should be in conducting macroprudential policy to enhance financial stability. This paper proposes that BOK should attempt to stabilize output while maintaining the flexible inflation targeting policy. The global financial crisis shows that price and output stability does not gaurantee financial stability and that financial instability can adversely affect price and output stability in turn. Therefore, the central bank should actively engage in achieving financial stability in advance. Monetary policy itself would not be sufficient to achieve financial stability. BOK needs proper tools to conduct macroprudential policy to satisfy the objective of financial stability added to the BOK Bylaws in 2011. One practical way is to amend the Bylaws to require that the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) should consult with BOK in macroprudential policy making process. At the same time, it is necessary to be explicit about the responsibility of BOK. For long-term solution, we suggest three proposals: (1) establishing the “Committee for Financial Stability” who is responsible for all policy making regarding macroprudential policy; (2) designating BOK as the main institution for macroprudential policy; (3) making BOK responsible for all policies regarding financial stability, replacing the role of FSC, following the case of U.K. in the post global financial crisis period. However, the last proposal is not so easy to implement in practice because it requires the overhaul of the whole banking and financial supervisory structure.

참고문헌 (96)

  1. 양적 완화, 엔저 현상, 금융 불안과 한국의 정책적 대응, "김소영", ~ (2014)
  2. 김소영, "자본시장의 글로벌화와 한국 통화정책의 독립성", KDI Journal of Economic Policy, 32(2), pp.1~26 (2010), 한국개발연구원
  3. 2012, , ~
  4. 신관호, "외환위기 이후 통화 및 환율정책의 평가", 경제학연구, 55(4), pp.275~312 (2007), 한국경제학회
  5. 윤석헌, "시스템리스크와 거시건전성 정책체계", 금융연구, 24(2), pp.29~72 (2010), 한국금융학회
  6. 이정연, "우리나라의 금융사이클 측정", 경제분석, 21(3), pp.137~155 (2015), 한국은행
  7. 한국은행, "보도자료 2009-11-31", ~ (2009)
  8. 한국의 통화정책, "한국은행", ~ (2012)
  9. Ajello, Andrea, "Financial Stability and Optimal Interest-Rate Policy", paper presented at the conference “The New Normal for Monetary Policy (2015), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
  10. Alesina, Alberto, "NBER Macroeconomics Annual", pp.17~52 (1988)
  11. Alesina, Alberto, "Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies", Economic Policy, 8(Spring), pp.58~98 (1989)
  12. Ammer, J., "Inflation Targeting in the 1990s: The Experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom", Journal of Economics and Business, 47, pp.165~192 (1995)
  13. Andersen, Thomas, "Inflation targeting and macroeconomic performance since the Great Recession", Oxford Economic Papers, pp.1~16 (2015)
  14. Monetary and Macroprudential Policies, "Angelini, Paolo", European Central Bank, ~, pp.working paper series No.1449 (2012)
  15. Bade, Robert, "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy", ~ (1982)
  16. Baillu, Jeannine, "Macroprudential Rules and Monetary Policy When Financial Frictions Matter", Economic Modelling, 50, pp.148~161 (2015)
  17. Ball, Laurence, "Inflation Dynamics and the Great Recession", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (Spring), pp.337~378 (2011)
  18. Barro, Robert, "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy", Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, pp.101~122 (1983)
  19. Monetary Policy in the New Normal, "Bayoumi, Tamim", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.Staff Discussion Notes No.14 (2014), 3
  20. "The Great Moderation" (2004)[URL]
  21. Bernanke, Ben, "Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk", Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, ~ (2009)
  22. Bernanke, Ben, "Monetary Policy and Asset Volatility", Economic Review, 84(4), pp.17~52 (1999), Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
  23. Bernanke, Ben, "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?", American Economic Review, 91, pp.253~257 (2001)
  24. Global Systemically Important Bank: Updated Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement, "BIS", Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ~ (2013)
  25. Blanchard, Olivier, "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model", Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(1), pp.36~65 (2007)
  26. Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy II: Getting Granular, "Blanchard, Olivier", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN (2013), 13[DOI]
  27. Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?, "Borio, C.", Bank for International Settlements, ~, pp.BIS Working Papers No 128 (2003)
  28. Borio, C, "The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomies: What Have We Learnt?", Journal of Banking and Finane, 45(C), pp.182~198 (2014)
  29. Borio, C, "Assessing the Risk of Banking Crises-Revisited", BIS Quarterly Review, pp.29~46 (2009)
  30. Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus, "Borio, Claudio", Bank for International Settlements, ~, pp.Working Paper 114 (2002)
  31. Securing Sustainable Price Stability:Should Credit Come Back from the Wilderness?, "Borio, Claudio", BIS, ~, pp.Working Paper, No.157 (2004)
  32. Whither Monetary and Financial Stability? The implications of evolving policy regimes, "Borio, C", BIS, ~, pp.Working Papers, no 147 (2004)
  33. Buiter, Willem H., "Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis for Regulators and Supervisors", London School of Economics, ~ (2009)
  34. Caballero, Ricardo, "Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of Knowledge Syndrome", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4), pp.85~102 (2010)
  35. Inflation Targeting and Sudden Stops, "Caballero, Ricardo", National Bureau of Economic Research, ~, pp.NBER Working Paper 9599 (2003)
  36. Caballero, Ricardo, "Persistent Appreciations and Overshooting: A Normative Analysis" (2009), MIT
  37. When Capital Adequacy and Interest Rate Policy are Substitutes (and When They are Not), "Cecchetti, Stephen", Bank for International Settlements, ~, pp.BIS Working Paper 379 (2012)
  38. Bank Leverage Regulation and Macroeconomic Dynamics, "Christensen, Ian", Bank of Canada, ~, pp.Bank of Canada Working Paper 11-32 (2011)
  39. Christiano, L J, "Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol.1A", pp.65~148 (1999), Elsevier North-Holland
  40. Clarida, Richard, "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence", European Economic Review, 42, pp.1033~1067 (1998)
  41. Crowe, Christopher, "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness", European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), pp.763~777 (2008)
  42. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov, "Central bank independence and price stability: evidence from OECD-countries", Oxford Economics Papers, 64(3), pp.410~422 (2008)
  43. Drehmann, Mathias, "The credit-to-GDP gap and countercyclical capital buffers: questions and answers", BIS Quarterly Review (2014)
  44. Farhi, Emmanuel, "Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts", American Economic Review, 102(1), pp.60~93 (2012)
  45. Stabilizing Properties of Flexible Exchange Rates:Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis, "Gagnon, Joseph", Peterson Institute for International Economics, ~, pp.Number PB13-28 (2013)
  46. Monetary and Macroprudential Policies in an Estimated Model with Financial Intermediation, "Gelain, P", National Bank of Belgium, ~, pp.Working Paper, No.258 (2014)
  47. Gurkaynak, Refet, "Does Inflation Targeting Anchor Long-Run Inflation Expectations? Evidence from the U.S., UK, and Sweden", Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(6), pp.1208~1242 (2010)
  48. Hahm, Joon-Ho, "Asia's Role in the Post-Crisis Global Economy" (2012), Asia Economic Policy Conference Volume Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
  49. Hanson, Samuel G., "A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(1), pp.3~28 (2011)
  50. Flattening of the Phillips Curve: Implications for Monetary Policy, "Iakova, Dora", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.IMF Working Paper No.07 (2007), 76
  51. International Monetary Fund, "Inflation Targeting and the IMF", prepared by Monetary and Financial Systems Department, Policy and Development Review Department (2006), International Monetary Fund
  52. Externalities and Macroprudential Policy, "International Monetary Fund", International Monetary Fund, ~ (2012)
  53. International Monetary Fund, "The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Has Inflation Been Muzzled or Was It Just Sleeping? World Economic Outlook, chapter 3", 79~95 (2013)
  54. Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, "International Monetary Fund", International Monetary Fund, ~ (2015)
  55. Jonsson, M, "The Linkages between Monetary and Macroprudential Policies", Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 1, pp.1~21 (2014)
  56. Kahn, George A., "Conducting Monetary Policy with Inflation Targets", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, pp.5~32 (1998)
  57. Kannan, Prakash, "Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Rules in a Model with House Price Booms", The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Contributions, 12(1), pp.1~44 (2012)
  58. 김소영, "The International Monetary System and the Available International Policy Options for Emerging Countries", Seoul Journal of Economics, 28(2), pp.199~212 (2015), 경제연구소
  59. Managing Price and Financial Stability Objectives? What Can We Learn from the Asia-Pacific Region?, "Kim, S", BIS, ~, pp.Working Paper No.553 (2015)
  60. Korinek, Anton, "Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View" (2010), University of Maryland
  61. Does Talk Matter After All? Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Behavior, "Kuttner, K.N.", Federal Reserve Bank, 88~ (1999)
  62. Kydland, F., "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans", Journal of Political Economy, 85, pp.473~490 (1977)
  63. Leeper, Eric M., "Bringing Financial Stability into Monetary Policy", Prepared for Sveriges Riksbank (2014)
  64. The Macroprudential Framework: Policy Responsiveness and Institutional Arrangements, "Lim, Cheng Hoon", International Monetary Fund, ~ (2013)
  65. Lin, Shu, "Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference in Developing Countries?", Journal of Development Economics, 89(1), pp.118~123 (2009)
  66. Explicit Inflation Objectives and Macroeconomic Outcomes, "Levin, Andrew T.", European Central Bank, ~, pp.Working Paper Series 383 (2004)
  67. "How Should We Respond to Asset Price Bubbles-" (2008)[URL]
  68. Mishkin, Frederic S., "Monetary Policy Flexibility, Risk Management, and Financial Disruptions", Journal of Asian Economics, 23, pp.242~246 (2010)
  69. Mishkin, Frederic S., "Monetary Policy Revisited: Lessons from the Crisis", pp.67~118 (2011), European Central Bank
  70. Mishkin, Frederic S., "Banking and Financial Markets" (2013), Pearson
  71. Mishkin, Frederic S., "Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting" (2007), Central Bank of Chile
  72. Mishkin, Frederic S., "Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Four Countries", Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, pp.9~110 (1997)
  73. Neuman, Manfred J.M., "Does Inflation Targeting Matter?", Review (2002), The Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis
  74. Macroprudential and microprudential policies: toward cohabitation, "Osinski, Jacek", IMF, ~, pp.Working Paper (13 (2013), 15)
  75. Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls, "Ostry, Jonathan D.", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.IMF Staff Position Note 10 (2010), 04
  76. Managing Capital Inflows: What Tools to Use?, "Ostry, Jonathan D.", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.IMF Staff Discussion Notes 11 (2011), 06
  77. Two Targets, Two Instruments: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Market Economies, "Ostry, Jonathan D.", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN (2012), 12[DOI]
  78. Rajan, Raghuram, "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), pp.399~441 (1994)
  79. Reinhart, Carmen, "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), pp.1~48 (2004)
  80. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, "Policy Targets Agreement 1990", ~ (1990)
  81. Reserve Bank of New Zealand, "Policy Targets Agreement 2002", ~ (2002)
  82. Rey, Helene, "Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Policy Symposium (2013)
  83. Rogoff, Kenneth, "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to a Monetary Target", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100, pp.1169~1190 (1985)
  84. Rose, A. K., "Surprising Similarities: Recent Monetary Regimes of Small Economies", Journal of International Money and Finance, 49, pp.5~27 (2014)
  85. Shim, I, "Database for Policy Actions on Housing Markets", BIS Quarterly Review, pp.83~95 (2013)
  86. Shin, Hyun Song, "Calrendon Lectures in Finance" (2010), Oxford University Press
  87. Pro-cyclicality and Monetary Aggregates, "Shin, Hyun Song", National Bureau of Economic Research, ~, pp.NBER Working Paper Series No.16836 (2011)
  88. Siklos, Pierre L., "Inflation-Target Design: Changing Inflation Performance and Persistence in Industrial Countries", Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 81(2), pp.46~58 (1999)
  89. Sims, C. A., "Macroeconomics and reality", Econometrica, 48(1), pp.1~48 (1980)
  90. Svensson, Lars E.O., "Inflation Targeting and Leaning Against the Wind", South African Reserve Bank, Fourteen Years of Inflation Targeting in South Africa and the Challenge of a Changing Mandate: South African Reserve Bank Conference Proceedings (2015)
  91. Svensson, Lars, "Cost-benefit Analysis of Leaning against the Wind", presentation at the AQR Institute of Asset Management event Perspectives:Unprecedented Monetary Policy Intervention (2015), London Business School
  92. Taylor, John B., "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, pp.195~214 (1993)
  93. Capital Flows and Financial Stability: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Responses, "Unsal, Filiz", International Monetary Fund, ~, pp.IMF Working Paper 11-189 (2011)
  94. Is Price Stability Enough?, "White, William", BIS, ~, pp.Working Paper 205 (2006)
  95. Should Monetary Policy ‘Lean or Clean’?, "White, William", Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, ~, pp.Working Paper No.34 (2009)
  96. Wren-Lewis, Simon, "Written Evidence on the Appointment of Dr. Mark Careny as Governor of the Bank of England", House of Commons Treasury Committee, 3~6 (2013)

관련 논문AI추천

전환기 한국은행의 역할김인준한국경제학회 · 한국경제포럼2019 · 제11권 제4호물가안정과 금융안정의 관계분석강명헌한국국제경제학회 · 국제경제연구2018 · 제24권 제1호시스템리스크 관리를 위한 금융감독기구와 한국은행 간 거시건전성정책 협력김진호한국경제의 분석패널 · 한국경제의 분석2013 · 제19권 제3호거시경제와 금융안정을 종합 고려한 최적 통화정책체계 연구오형석, 허준영한국개발연구원 · KDI Journal of Economic Policy2024 · 제46권 제1호금융안정을 위한 중앙은행의 역할박창균, 신관호, 정지만한국경제의 분석패널 · 한국경제의 분석2009 · 제15권 제3호물가안정목표제의 경험과 한국은행의 과제전성인한국국제금융학회 · 국제금융연구2014 · 제4권 제1호

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (3건)

우리나라 정부신뢰 문제에 대한 이해와 분석김우철pp. 1-56샤플리값을 이용한 한국읜 소득 및 자산 불평등의 원천별 기여도 분석이성재, 이우진pp. 57-109가계부채 관리 제도의 방향 설정: 국제 사례를 통한 정책적 시사점을 중심으로안현미, 박기영, 성태윤pp. 111-183
원문 보기