디지털 플랫폼의 규제 근거에 관한 검토
A Study on the Regulatory Basis of Digital Platform
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(Purpose) This study aims to examine the regulatory foundations for addressing the abuse of market dominance by large digital platform operators wielding significant power in the digital economy. (Design/methodology/approach) To achieve this objective, the study analyzes the regulatory framework and legal principles governing digital platforms. Specifically, it reviews the evolution of the essential facilities doctrine, explores the concept of quasi-essential facilities, and examines regulatory jurisprudence under individual industry-specific regulatory laws. (Findings) The essential facilities doctrine, which has been discussed in both theoretical and case law contexts for over a century, aims to prevent dominant firms controlling bottleneck facilities from abusing their market power to the detriment of competition. However, the stringent or ambiguous requirements under existing case law have posed challenges for its application. In response, the quasi-essential facilities theory has emerged as a viable alternative, easing the regulatory authorities' evidentiary burdens. Additionally, the proposal to regulate digital platforms as key telecommunication operators has gained traction. In Korea, the adoption of the quasi-essential facilities theory appears to be a practical and effective solution. (Research applications or Originality) Legal research on the essential facilities doctrine as a regulatory mechanism for digital platforms remains limited in Korea. However, given the global regulatory trends, such research is both timely and necessary. This study synthesizes and analyzes three key international perspectives on the issue and offers policy recommendations tailored to the Korean regulatory landscape.
Abstract
(Purpose) This study aims to examine the regulatory foundations for addressing the abuse of market dominance by large digital platform operators wielding significant power in the digital economy. (Design/methodology/approach) To achieve this objective, the study analyzes the regulatory framework and legal principles governing digital platforms. Specifically, it reviews the evolution of the essential facilities doctrine, explores the concept of quasi-essential facilities, and examines regulatory jurisprudence under individual industry-specific regulatory laws. (Findings) The essential facilities doctrine, which has been discussed in both theoretical and case law contexts for over a century, aims to prevent dominant firms controlling bottleneck facilities from abusing their market power to the detriment of competition. However, the stringent or ambiguous requirements under existing case law have posed challenges for its application. In response, the quasi-essential facilities theory has emerged as a viable alternative, easing the regulatory authorities' evidentiary burdens. Additionally, the proposal to regulate digital platforms as key telecommunication operators has gained traction. In Korea, the adoption of the quasi-essential facilities theory appears to be a practical and effective solution. (Research applications or Originality) Legal research on the essential facilities doctrine as a regulatory mechanism for digital platforms remains limited in Korea. However, given the global regulatory trends, such research is both timely and necessary. This study synthesizes and analyzes three key international perspectives on the issue and offers policy recommendations tailored to the Korean regulatory landscape.
참고문헌 (33)
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