불교철학에 있어 학파적 복합성과 독단성(1)_世親의 唯識二十論에서의 외계대상 비판의 경우

Abstract

In case that an external object was the congregation of paramāṇus(atoms), Vasubandhu criticized an external object with the logical dilemma in Viṃśatikā v.10-13, that if it is their partial congregation, they have parts, but that if it is their general congregation, congregated matter should amount to one paramāṇu in size, and that one should say that if they do not congregate with others because they do not have any parts, congregated matter does not have either, and that if they have parts, they cannot be said to be paramāṇu. Such dilemma, however, had already been examined in Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra. According to it, Saṃghabhadra provided that the external object perceived by us was 'the produced as it is in the absolute approach of paramāṇus without any gap' and called it 'congregation without a gap(和集)'. Sthavira Śrīlāta provided that 'a paramāṇu itself actually congregation with others because it is a part in itself' and called it 'inseparable congregation(和合)'. Thus, Vasubandhu's criticism may be significant as a presupposition for revealing the theory of Vijñaptimātratā, but is insignificant as criticism itself. As far as the theory of paramāṇu in Mahāvibhāṣaśāstra or Saṃghabhadra's and Sthavira's arguments are not considered, it is inevitably said to be his. In that case, Buddhist philosophy will not be able to evade dogmatism. Together with it, the criticism of the Yogācāra school on congregation without a gap and inseparable congregation of paramāṇus is made in connection with the object of cognition(ālambana) in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣa v.2-5. It is also so. It will be dealt with in a sequel.